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Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets∗
Kyle Bagwell and Gea M. Lee
Abstract
We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about
their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists
in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers
rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest-advertising firm
since lower-cost firms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game, colluding firms face
a trade-off: the use of advertising can promote productive efficiency, but only if sufficient current
or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if firms pool at zero advertising, they
sacrifice productive efficiency but also eliminate current and future advertising expenses. Focusing
on symmetric perfect public equilibria for the repeated advertising game, we establish conditions
under which optimal collusion entails pooling at zero advertising. More generally, full or partial
pooling is observed in optimal collusion. Such collusive agreements reduce consumer welfare,
since they restrict informed consumers’ ability to locate the lowest available price in the market.
KEYWORDS: advertising, collusion, private information, retail markets
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1 Introduction
Modern theoretical analyses of collusion emphasize collusion in prices or quan-
tities. This emphasis is appropriate for many applications; however, collusion
may also occur with respect to instruments of non-price competition. One
possibility of particular interest is that firms select their advertising levels in
a collusive fashion. This possibility has not received significant theoretical
attention.1
One reason may be that the empirical literature on collusion and advertis-
ing oﬀers somewhat mixed findings.2 Ferguson (1974) argues that advertising
activity is publicly observable and thus that collusion in advertising is feasible;
and Cable (1972), Greer (1971) and Sutton (1974) emphasize the possibility of
collusion in advertising among firms in highly concentrated markets, in their
interpretations of the empirical relationship between advertising and concen-
tration. Simon (1970) and Scherer (1980), however, argue that advertising
activities are diﬃcult to assess and monitor, and thus suggest that collusion
in advertising may be diﬃcult to achieve. More recently, Gasmi, Laﬀont and
Vuong (1992) argue that Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola colluded in advertising
and possibly price over a sample period that covers the late 1970s and early
1980s, and Kadiyali (1996) reports evidence that Kodak and Fuji colluded in
price and advertising in the U.S. photographic film industry in the 1980s. But
Symeonidis (2000) reports an absence of collusion in non-price variables like
advertising in his study of U.K. manufacturing cartels.
In the specific context of retail markets, however, some interesting empirical
relationships between advertising and prices have been identified. In his classic
study of the retail eyeglass industry in the U.S. in the 1960s, Benham (1972)
compares transaction prices under diﬀerent legal systems: prices were higher in
states that prohibited all advertising than in states that had no restrictions on
advertising; in addition, prices were only slightly higher in states that allowed
just non-price advertising than in states that also allowed price advertising.
Apparently, the ability to advertise even in only a non-price form is sometimes
associated with lower prices. Similar findings are reported by Cady (1976) in
his analysis of the U.S. retail market for prescription drugs in 1970. This work
suggests the possibility that retail firms might sometimes gain if they are able
to limit the use of non-price advertising. Of course, retail firms directly achieve
1For exceptions, see Friedman (1983) and Stigler (1968). Friedman characterizes open-
loop Nash equilibria in a repeated game of advertising and quantity competition, while
Stigler compares cartels that collude in advertising and compete in price with those that
collude in price and compete in advertising. See also Nocke (2007) for a recent analysis
of collusive equilibria in a dynamic game of investment, where investment may be thought of
as quality-improving R&D or persuasive advertising.
2For a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
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an agreement to limit advertising when a state law prohibits advertising.3 In
the absence of such a state law, retail firms may interact repeatedly and seek
to achieve a self-enforcing agreement to limit advertising.
Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) oﬀer an equilibrium interpretation of Benham’s
findings. They develop a complete-information model of retail competition, in
which some consumers are “informed” and can identify the highest-advertising
firm, while other consumers are “uninformed” and do not observe advertising
levels. All consumers possess downward-sloping demand curves and must visit
a firm in order to observe its price. Bagwell and Ramey focus on two kinds of
equilibria. In a random equilibrium, consumers ignore advertising and choose
firms at random. Consequently, firms do not advertise, and they enjoy sym-
metric market shares. In an advertising equilibrium, informed consumers use
the advertising search rule, whereby they go to the highest-advertising firm. In
response to this consumer behavior, firms employ a symmetric mixed strategy
that pairs higher advertising choices with greater investments in cost reduction
and thus lower prices. Informed consumers are then rational in using the ad-
vertising search rule. For a fixed number of firms, expected profit is higher in
the random equilibrium, because advertising expenses are thereby avoided. In
a free-entry model, their findings regarding the relationship between non-price
advertising and average transaction prices are broadly consistent with the em-
pirical patterns that Benham reports, if the random equilibrium is associated
with a setting in which advertising is legally banned.
In this paper, we modify the Bagwell-Ramey model in two key respects.
First, we assume that firms have private information as to their respective
production costs. We consider an incomplete-information model with a con-
tinuum of possible cost types, where cost types are iid across firms. In the
corresponding static game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-
cost firms advertise more and price lower than do higher-cost firms. Informed
consumers are again rational in using the advertising search rule. The ad-
vertising equilibrium may then be compared with the random equilibrium in
which no firm advertises and consumers pick a firm at random.4 Second, we
3Alternatively, retail firms might achieve such an agreement by forming a professional
association that imposes advertising restrictions on its members. The FTC has argued that
anti-competitive eﬀects may be associated with price and non-price advertising restrictions
imposed by a professional association. See California Dental Association v. Federal Trade
Commission (1999).
4In our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010), we analyze the static advertising game
in greater detail. We compare the advertising equilibrium with the random equilibrium, both
when the number of firms is fixed and when the number of firms is endogenous under free
entry. We thereby consider the short- and long-run implications of advertising competition
for consumer surplus, firm profit and social welfare. We also analyze a benchmark model
of price competition and compare the corresponding pricing equilibrium with the advertising
2
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assume that firms interact repeatedly over an infinite horizon, where advertis-
ing selections are publicly observed by firms and each firm’s cost type is iid
over time. With this second modification, we may consider any self-enforcing
collusive agreement among firms. Thus, in our modified model, the search for
an optimal collusive equilibrium among firms entails significantly more than a
particular comparison between the random and advertising equilibria.
Assuming that informed consumers use the advertising search rule in each
period, we focus on the symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE) of our
repeated advertising game. For this class of equilibria, our goal is to char-
acterize the optimal form of collusion in advertising among firms.5 We note
that the SPPE solution concept includes a wide range of behaviors. Firms
may repeatedly play the (non-cooperative) advertising equilibrium of the sta-
tic game, and patient firms may also enforce zero advertising in all periods. In
the latter case, collusion among firms is used to implement repeatedly the ran-
dom equilibrium. The random equilibrium is then achieved as a self-enforcing
ban on advertising rather than as a consequence of a legal ban on advertising.
Patient firms may also implement other stationary advertising strategies, in-
cluding advertising schedules that take the form of step functions. A further
possibility is that firms implement non-stationary SPPE, in which they move
between cooperative and war phases in their advertising conduct.
When firms collude in private-information settings, two kinds of incentive
constraints arise.6 First, each firm must not gain by undertaking an “on-
schedule deviation,” whereby a firm with one cost type deviates and mimics
the behavior that is prescribed for this firm when it has a diﬀerent cost type.
The on-schedule incentive constraint is analogous to the standard truth-telling
constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems. An important feature
of an on-schedule deviation is that no other firm would be aware that a devia-
tion actually occurred. The second kind of deviation is called an “oﬀ-schedule
deviation.” An oﬀ-schedule deviation occurs when a firm takes an action that
is not specified in equilibrium for any of its possible cost types. Importantly,
an oﬀ-schedule deviation is publicly observed as a deviation. As in standard re-
peated games, an oﬀ-schedule deviation is punished harshly; thus, suﬃciently
patient firms will not undertake oﬀ-schedule deviations.
Colluding firms face interesting trade-oﬀs when selecting an optimal col-
lusive scheme. Suppose firms contemplate the repeated use of the advertis-
equilibrium. As well, we oﬀer further comparisons of our findings for the static advertising
game with those of Bagwell and Ramey (1994).
5In the stage game, sequential search is not allowed, and firms are thus able to select
their respective monopoly prices. We therefore embed monopoly pricing into the profit
functions and focus on collusion in advertising.
6The discussion here follows Athey et al. (2004) and Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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ing equilibrium of the static game. An advantage of this scheme is that it
maximizes productive eﬃciency: in each period, lower-cost firms advertise at
strictly higher levels, and so informed consumers are allocated to the lowest-
cost firm. A disadvantage of this scheme, however, is that firms’ profits are
reduced by high advertising expenditures. Firms may thus look for some way
to keep the productive-eﬃciency advantage while reducing advertising expen-
ditures. They might thus consider a strictly decreasing advertising schedule
that is “flatter” and involves lower levels of advertising. Such a schedule,
however, will induce higher-cost types to raise their advertising and mimic
lower-cost types, unless higher advertising selections result in some future cost.
Given our focus on SPPE, any future cost must be experienced symmetrically
by all firms. The future cost may thus take the form of a future advertising
“war” in which higher and less profitable advertising schedules are employed.
This discussion points to two general themes. First, there is a substitutability
between current-period advertising and future advertising wars. Second, the
productive-eﬃciency benefits that are associated with sorting can be enjoyed
only if the informational cost of high current or future advertising levels is also
experienced.
We show that an optimal SPPE exists that is also stationary (i.e., that does
not use wars). This result holds for any demand function and for any distri-
bution function of cost types. We thus confirm at a general level that future
advertising wars are a redundant instrument: firms cannot achieve strictly
higher profits with a non-stationary SPPE than with a stationary SPPE. We
also characterize an optimal SPPE that is stationary. In particular, if the
distribution function is log-concave and the demand function is suﬃciently in-
elastic, then an optimal SPPE for suﬃciently patient firms entails pooling at
zero advertising for all cost types in all periods. We also strengthen this finding
and establish that, under the same conditions, any optimal SPPE is stationary
and entails pooling at zero advertising by all cost types in all periods. Thus,
while our SPPE solution concept allows for a wide range of behaviors, we show
that important conditions exist under which advertising behavior in any op-
timal SPPE of our repeated game takes a remarkably simple form: along the
equilibrium path, no firm advertises in any period.
When firms collude in this way, the welfare of consumers is reduced be-
low that which they enjoy in the advertising equilibrium of the static game.
Intuitively, in our model, the induced distribution of posted prices is inde-
pendent of the advertising selections of firms. This means that uninformed
consumers enjoy the same consumer surplus whether or not firms eliminate
non-price advertising. In the advertising equilibrium, however, informed con-
sumers use non-price advertising to infer the identity of the lowest-cost, and
thus the lowest-price, firm in the market. The average transaction price is thus
4
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increased when firms collude and eliminate non-price advertising. Collusion of
this kind thus acts to reduce the welfare of informed consumers.
We emphasize that the characterization of optimal collusive conduct de-
scribed above requires patient firms and assumes suﬃciently inelastic demand.
Firms must be patient in order to resist undertaking an oﬀ-schedule deviation
and advertising a positive amount. For patient firms, the immediate gain in
profit would be overwhelmed by the loss in future profit that would ensue.
For example, such a deviation might trigger reversion to the advertising equi-
librium of the static game in all future periods. Likewise, for other demand
functions, optimal SPPE may not entail zero advertising by all types. We thus
also characterize optimal SPPE behavior under general demand functions. Re-
quiring suﬃciently patient firms, we establish three additional findings.
First, for any demand function, if the support of possible cost types is
suﬃciently small, then any optimal SPPE entails pooling at zero advertising
by all types in all periods. Second, for any demand function and for any
distribution function of cost types, any optimal SPPE involves at least partial
pooling; in particular, any optimal SPPE entails pooling at the bottom and at
the top (i.e., on intervals of cost types adjoining the lowest-cost and highest-
cost types).7 This second finding ensures that, under general conditions, an
optimal SPPE for patient firms strictly improves upon the repeated use of
the static advertising equilibrium in which advertising is strictly decreasing
in cost type. Third, for a large family of demand and distribution functions,
we show that any optimal SPPE uses at most two pooling intervals: it is
characterized by either one pooling step at zero advertising or two pooling
steps at the bottom and at the top, with or without an intermediate sorting
interval. Firms limit the number of pooling steps to diminish advertising
expenses. Again, such collusive agreements harm consumer welfare, since they
restrict informed consumers’ ability to locate the lowest available price in the
market.
Our analysis of the repeated advertising game is closely related to work
by Athey et al. (2004).8 They consider a repeated game in which firms have
private cost shocks and collude in pricing. The game considered by Athey et
al.may be thought of as a repeated first-price (procurement) auction, while
7When an optimal SPPE entails positive advertising for some cost types, we may gen-
erate the associated payoﬀs using a stationary or non-stationary SPPE. The reason is
that firms may then allocate advertising expenses across periods, because of the sub-
stitutability between current-period advertising and future advertising wars.
8See also McAfee and McMillan (1992) for a related theory of identical bidding among
collusive bidders. They develop their results for a first-price auction in a static model.
Our model of advertising is analogous to an all-pay auction, and we also present a dynamic
analysis. For other analyses of repeated games with private information in which SPPE are
analyzed, see Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Hanazono and Yang (2007) and Lee (2007, 2010).
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the repeated advertising game that we analyze here is analogous to a repeated
all-pay auction. In their paper, when the distribution of cost types is log-
concave, if demand is suﬃciently inelastic and firms are suﬃciently patient,
then firms always select the same price, regardless of their respective cost
types, along the equilibrium path of any optimal SPPE. As described above,
we establish a similar finding in our model of collusion in advertising. As well,
we report that any optimal SPPE for patient firms is stationary and entails
pooling at zero advertising, even for elastic demand functions, if the support
of possible cost types is suﬃciently small.9 For a large family of demand and
distribution functions, we also show that an optimal SPPE entails at most two
pooling intervals. Finally, Athey et al. also show that, if demand is suﬃciently
inelastic, then an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary. In our model of
collusion in advertising, for general demand functions, an optimal SPPE exists
that is stationary.
In other related work, Peters (1984) and LeBlanc (1998) consider the eﬀects
of a prohibition on price advertising in models where each firm is privately
informed about its production cost. By contrast, here we emphasize that firms
can achieve a self-enforcing restriction on non-price advertising. Also, Bagwell
and Ramey (1994b) consider a duopoly model in which one firm has private
information as to whether its costs are high or low. In a static setting, they
show that non-price advertising may be used to signal low costs and thus low
prices. In the current paper, by contrast, we adopt a continuum-type model in
which all firms are privately informed as to their costs. In a dynamic setting
where restrictions on non-price advertising must be self-enforced, we show that
firms often have incentive to restrict the use of non-price advertising.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the static advertising
game. The repeated game is examined in Section 3. Optimal collusion for
patient firms is characterized in Section 4. Section 5 characterizes the critical
discount factor above which optimal SPPE entail pooling at zero advertising
or two pooling intervals. Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix, we discuss the
robustness of our analysis and provide additional proofs.
2 The Static Advertising Game
We begin with a static game in which firms compete through advertising for
market share. Firms are privately informed as to their respective costs, and
each firm’s advertising choice may signal its costs, and thus its price, to those
9We also consider the case of a uniform distribution of types and a demand function
whose elasticity is constant and above unity. If the elasticity of demand does not exceed
a critical level, then any optimal SPPE for patient firms is again stationary and entails
pooling at zero advertising.
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consumers who are informed of advertising activities. We establish the exis-
tence of two kinds of equilibria, advertising and random equilibria, and com-
pare the expected profits earned by firms under these two equilibria. Our
analysis of the advertising game of the static model is developed further in our
companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010).
2.1 The Model
We assume N ≥ 2 ex ante identical firms. The firms compete for sales in a
homogeneous-good market, and each firm i is privately informed of its unit cost
level θi. Firm i’s cost type θi is drawn from the support [θ, θ] according to the
twice-continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function, F (θ), where θ > θ ≥ 0.
Cost types are iid across firms. We define the density as f(θ) ≡ F 0(θ), where
f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. After firms observe their individual cost types,
the firms simultaneously choose their prices and levels of advertising. We
follow Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) and assume that advertising is a dissipative
expense that does not directly aﬀect consumer demand.
The market contains a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer has a twice-
continuously diﬀerentiable demand function D(p) that satisfies D(p) > 0 >
D0(p) over the relevant range of prices p. We assume that prices cannot be
directly communicated in the market. Consumers thus cannot observe prices
prior to picking a firm to visit and from which to purchase. Consumers are
divided into two groups. A fraction I of consumers are informed in the sense
that they observe firms’ advertising expenses.10 Based on this information, in-
formed consumers form beliefs as to firms’ cost types and employ a visitation
(search) strategy. For instance, informed consumers may use an advertising
search rule, in which a consumer goes to the highest-advertising firm.11 The
remaining fraction U = 1−I of consumers do not observe advertising expendi-
tures and are uninformed. Uninformed consumers may adopt a random search
rule, whereby a consumer randomly chooses which firm to visit.
We now define the following advertising game: (i) firms learn their own
cost types, (ii) firms make simultaneous choices of advertising and price, and
(iii) given any advertising information, each consumer chooses a firm to visit,
observes that firm’s price and makes desired purchases given this price. Ob-
serve that a consumer can visit only one firm.12 As we explain below, this
10It is not essential that informed consumers observe all advertising expenditures. All
of our results hold if informed consumers observe only the identity of the highest-advertising
firm(s).
11If more than one firm advertises at the highest level, then the advertising search rule
requires that informed consumers choose randomly among the highest-advertising firms.
12In our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010), we develop a modified advertis-
ing model in which consumers can undertake costly sequential search and firms choose
7
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assumption simplifies our analysis, since it ensures that each firm chooses the
monopoly price that is associated with its cost type for any sales it makes.
For the advertising game of the static model, we are interested in Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria. We impose two additional requirements on our solu-
tion concept. First, we restrict attention to equilibria in which consumers do
not condition their visitation decision on firms’ “names.” Thus, uninformed
consumers must use the random search rule, and, for any given vector of firm
advertising levels, informed consumers must treat symmetrically any two firms
which advertise at the same level. We note that informed consumers satisfy
this requirement when they use the advertising search rule. Second, we restrict
attention to equilibria in which firms use symmetric pricing and advertising
strategies. Observe that the random search rule is indeed an optimal search
strategy for uninformed consumers, when firms use symmetric pricing strate-
gies.
Using our symmetry requirement, we can define a pure advertising strategy
for firm i as a function A(θi) that maps from the set of cost types [θ, θ] to
the set of possible advertising expenditures R+ ≡ [0,∞). Let the vector
A(θ−i) denote the advertising selections of firms other than i when these
firms all use the schedule A and their cost types are given by the (N − 1)-
tuple θ−i. For any given search rule used by informed consumers, firm i’s
market share is determined by the vector of advertising levels selected by firm
i and its rivals. Thus, the market share for firm i maps from RN+ to [0, 1] and
in equilibrium may be represented as m(A(θi),A(θ−i)).13 Note that, under
our first requirement above, firm i’s market share is not indexed by i and
thus does not depend on firm i’s name. Thus, if firm i has cost type θi,
advertises at level A(θi) and anticipates that its rivals employ the strategy
A to determine their advertising levels, then its interim-stage market share is
given by M(A(θi);A) ≡ Eθ−i [m(A(θi),A(θ−i))].
We next define a firm i’s expected profit. Let r(p, θi) ≡ (p − θi)D(p)
denote a firm i’s net revenue (excluding advertising expenses) when it has
cost type θi, sets the price p and sells to the entire unit mass of consumers.
We assume r(p, θi) is strictly concave in p with a unique maximizer p(θi) =
advertising levels and prices. We establish the existence of an advertising equilibrium
and show that the possibility of sequential search serves to strengthen our main find-
ing that firms may achieve higher expected profit when they restrict the use of adver-
tising.
13For example, if all consumers use the random search rule, thenm(A(θi),A(θ−i)) = 1N . If
instead the uninformed consumers use the random search rule while the informed consumers
use the advertising search rule, thenm(A(θi),A(θ−i)) = I+ UN if A(θi) > A(θj) for all j 6= i,
while m(A(θi),A(θ−i)) = UN if A(θi) < A(θj) for some j 6= i. For this latter set of
consumer search strategies, if firm i ties with k−1 other firms for the highest advertising level,
then m(A(θi),A(θ−i)) = Ik +
U
N .
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argmaxp r(p, θi). The monopoly price p(θi) then strictly increases in θi whereas
r(p(θi), θi) strictly decreases in θi. We also assume p(θ) > θ, so that the
price “at the top” has a positive margin. Using our requirement that all
consumers, and specifically uninformed consumers, treat all firms symmetri-
cally, we conclude that all firms must receive positive expected market share.
In the equilibria upon which we focus, therefore, each firm must select the
monopoly price given its cost type. We may thus embed the monopoly price
into the revenue function and define the interim-stage net revenue for firm i by
R(A(θi), θi;A) ≡ r(p(θi), θi)M(A(θi);A). We further simplify our notation by
ignoring subscript i. If a firm of type θ picks an advertising level A(bθ) when
its rivals employ the strategy A to determine their advertising levels, then its
interim-stage profit is
Π(A(bθ), θ;A) ≡ r(p(θ), θ)M(A(bθ);A)−A(bθ). (1)
≡ R(A(bθ), θ;A)−A(bθ).
With our additional requirements embedded, we now define an equilibrium
as an advertising strategy A, a belief function and search rules for consumers
that collectively satisfy three remaining conditions. First, given the market
share function, m, that is induced by consumers’ search rules, the advertising
strategy A is such that, for all θ, A(θ) ∈ argmaxa [R(a, θ;A)− a].14 Second,
given an observed advertising level a by a firm, informed consumers use Bayes’
Rule whenever possible (i.e., whenever a = A(θ) for some θ ∈ [θ, θ]) in forming
their beliefs as to that firm’s cost type θ and thus price p(θ). Third, for any ob-
served vector of advertising levels, given their beliefs, the informed consumers’
search rule directs them to the firm or firms with the lowest expected price.
For a given equilibrium, a firm of type θ advertises at level A(θ). We can
thus express the firm’s expected revenue and profit, respectively, as
EθR(A(θ), θ;A) and Eθ[R(A(θ), θ;A)−A(θ)],
where the implicit market share functions are determined by the equilibrium
search rules of informed consumers. In the next subsection, we restrict at-
tention to equilibria in which informed consumer use particular search rules.
Equilibrium market share functions may then be explicitly and simply repre-
sented.
2.2 Advertising and Random Equilibria
In this subsection, we establish the existence of two kinds of equilibria. In an
advertising equilibrium, informed consumers use the advertising search rule.
14Notice that A(θ) must be an optimal choice for a firm with type θ in comparison to
advertising deviations that are “on-schedule” (i.e., a such that a = A(bθ) 6= A(θ) for somebθ ∈ [θ, θ]) as well as “oﬀ-schedule” (i.e., a such that a 6= A(θ) for any θ ∈ [θ, θ]).
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Since p(θ) is strictly increasing, such equilibria can exist only if the advertising
schedule A is nonincreasing, so that higher-advertising firms have lower costs
and thus oﬀer lower prices. In a random equilibrium, informed consumers
ignore advertising and use the random search rule. A random equilibrium
thus can exist only if firms maximize expected profits and do not advertise
(i.e., A ≡ 0).
We first consider advertising equilibria. In such an equilibrium, firms use an
advertising strategy A(θ), informed consumers use the advertising search rule,
and uninformed consumers are randomly distributed across all N firms. Since
r(p(θ), θ) is strictly decreasing, lower-cost firms enjoy market share expansion
more than do higher-cost firms. As the cost of advertising at any level is
independent of a firm’s cost type, we can thus easily show that equilibrium
interim-stage market share, M(A(θ);A), must be nonincreasing in a firm’s
cost type, θ.15 This implies in turn that A(θ) is also nonincreasing in θ,
since at the interim stage no firm would be willing to advertise more in order
to receive (weakly) less market share. Further, given the advertising search
rule, A(θ) cannot be constant over any interval of types: by increasing its
advertising an infinitesimal amount, a firm with a type on this interval would
experience a discrete gain in its expected market share. Thus, A(θ) must
be strictly decreasing, which implies that M(A(θ);A) = UN + [1− F (θ)]N−1I.
Given M(A(θ);A) = UN , a firm with type θ will select zero advertising, and so
A(θ) = 0.
These necessary conditions for an advertising equilibrium are developed in
further detail in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010). We establish
there also the following existence result:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique advertising equilibrium, and in this
equilibriumA(θ) is strictly decreasing and diﬀerentiable and satisfies A(θ) = 0.
The advertising equilibrium acts as a fully sorting (separating) mechanism:
firms truthfully reveal their cost types along the downward-sloping advertising
schedule. Informed consumers rationally employ the advertising search rule,
since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and also oﬀers the lowest price.
Thus, ostensibly uninformative advertising directs market share to the lowest-
cost supplier and promotes productive eﬃciency.
We next consider the random equilibrium, wherein all consumers use the
random search rule and thus divide up evenly across firms. Given the random
15This discussion reflects the underlying single-crossing property that holds in the model.
When a firm increases its advertising level, it confronts a trade oﬀ between the larger
advertising expense, a, and the consequent higher expected market share,M(a;A). Holding
the interim-stage profit constant, the slope da/dM(a;A) is given by r(p(θ), θ), which is
strictly decreasing in θ.
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search rule, each firm receives an equal share, 1N , of the unit mass of consumers.
Thus, M(A(θ);A) = 1N in a random equilibrium. Each firm thus chooses
zero advertising in a random equilibrium, since even informed consumers are
unresponsive to advertising. In addition, when firms pool and do not advertise,
the random search rule is a best response for each consumer.16 The random
equilibrium thus exists and takes the form of a pooling equilibrium.
Bagwell and Lee (2010) compare expected consumer surplus in these two
equilibria. Given that the induced distribution of monopoly prices is not al-
tered across the two equilibria, uninformed consumers expect the same con-
sumer surplus whether the advertising or random equilibrium is anticipated.
Informed consumers, however, expect strictly higher consumer surplus in the
advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium. The key point is that,
in the advertising equilibrium, informed consumers can infer the identity of
the lowest-cost, and thus the lowest-price, firm.
Bagwell and Lee also compare the expected profits earned by firms in these
equilibria. The comparison is subtle. The advertising equilibrium achieves pro-
ductive eﬃciency while the random equilibrium does not; however, the random
equilibrium also avoids all advertising expenses. They show that firms make a
strictly higher expected profit in the random equilibrium than in the advertis-
ing equilibrium, if F is log-concave and demand is suﬃciently inelastic or if the
support of possible cost types is suﬃciently small. This result suggests that
important circumstances exist under which retail firms would benefit from a
restriction on non-price retail advertising. As our discussion of the random
equilibrium confirms, advertising would not be used if informed consumers
were to ignore it. If informed consumers were responsive to advertising, how-
ever, then firms might nevertheless achieve such a restriction on advertising
if advertising were legally prohibited. Finally, even if advertising is legal and
informed consumers are responsive to advertising, firms may be able to elim-
inate advertising as part of an optimal self-enforcing collusive agreement. In
our analysis of the repeated game below, generalizing beyond the particular
comparison between the advertising and random equilibria, we confirm this
possibility by showing that firms may prefer zero advertising to any other self-
enforcing advertising scheme. Such a collusive agreement, however, reduces
16If informed consumers observe a deviation whereby some firm selects positive advertising,
then random search remains optimal in the event that informed consumers believe that
the deviating firm has an average type. Since such a deviation may be more attractive
to a lower-cost type, the random equilibrium may fail to be a “refined” equilibrium in
the static model. See Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) for an analysis of the refined equilibrium in
a static model of advertising in which one firm has two possible cost types. In the repeated
game that we analyze below, the random equilibrium is achieved as a self-enforcing ban on
advertising in which a deviation from zero advertising would cause a future advertising war.
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expected consumer surplus by eliminating the ability of informed consumers
to locate the lowest available price in the market.
3 The Repeated Advertising Game
We consider next a repeated game in which firms select advertising levels and
are privately informed with respect to their realized cost levels in each period.
In this section, we define the repeated game and present some programs that
are useful in the next section where we characterize optimal collusion for firms.
3.1 The Model
In each of an infinite number of periods, firms play the static advertising game
defined in Section 2. We assume henceforth that, in each period, informed
consumers use the advertising search rule. Uninformed consumers again use
the random search rule. As explained in Section 2, these search rules are
optimal in a given period if firms use symmetric strategies and lower-cost
types always advertise at (weakly) higher levels. As discussed in more detail
below, for the equilibrium concept that we employ, these requirements for
firms’ strategies are satisfied. Hence, in our formal definitions of the repeated
game and the equilibrium concept, we may simplify and focus exclusively on
the behavior of firms.
Upon entering a period, firms share a public history, in that each firm ob-
serves the realized advertising expenditures of all firms in all previous periods.
A firm also privately observes its current cost type. As well, each firm pri-
vately observes the history of the cost types that it had, the prices that it
selected and the advertising schedules that it used in previous periods. Thus,
we consider a setting in which a firm does not observe any rival firm’s current
or past cost types and also does not observe any rival firm’s current or past
advertising schedules. In addition, a firm does not observe the realized price
choice of any rival in any past period.17
The vectors of cost types, advertising schedules and realized advertisements
at date t are denoted θt ≡ (θit,θ−it), At ≡ (Ait,A−it) and at ≡ (ait, a−it).
Under the assumed consumer search rules, let mi(at) denote the market share
received by firm i when the advertising vector at is used. Then, an infinite
sequence {θt,At}∞t=1 generates a path-wise payoﬀ for firm i:
ui({θt,At}∞t=1) =
∞X
t=1
δt−1 [r (p (θit) , θit)mi(at)− ait] , (2)
17In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our analysis when this assumption is
relaxed. We argue there that forces in favor of pooling remain, even when prices are public.
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where ait = Ait(θit) and δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common discount factor for
firms. Notice that we embed the monopoly price selection into the net revenue
function, r. This simplifies the analysis and is without loss of generality given
our assumption that past prices are not public among firms. As in the static
model, we assume that cost shocks are iid across firms. For the repeated game,
we introduce as well the assumption that cost shocks are iid over time.18 With
this assumption, the repeated game takes a recursive structure.
As our solution concept, we employ Perfect Public Equilibrium (Fudenberg
et al., 1994). We thus focus on public strategies. A firm uses a public strategy
when a firm’s current advertising level depends on its current cost level and
the public history of realized advertising levels. At the close of date τ , the
public history of realized advertisements is hτ = {at}τt=1. Let Hτ be the
set of potential public histories at date τ . A public strategy for firm i in
period τ , siτ , is a mapping from Hτ−1 to the set of stage-game strategies
{A | A : [θ, θ]→ R+}. For simplicity, we assume that any stage-game strategy
A is continuously diﬀerentiable except at perhaps a finite number of points
where A jumps. A public strategy for firm i, si, is then a sequence {sit}∞t=1,
and a profile of public strategies is s = {s1, ..., sN}. We restrict attention to
Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium (SPPE), whereby s = s1 = ... = sN .
Thus, in an SPPE, firms adopt symmetric advertising schedules after every
history: siτ (hτ−1) = sjτ(hτ−1) for all i, j, τ and hτ−1.
3.2 Dynamic Programming Approach
Building on work by Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), we apply a dynamic program-
ming approach to our recursive setting. Let V ⊂ R be the set of SPPE values.
Note that, at this point, we have not established supV ∈ V or inf V ∈ V .
Following Abreu et al., any symmetric public strategy profile s = {s, ..., s} can
be factored into two components: a first-period advertising schedule A and
a continuation-value function v : RN+ → R. The continuation-value function
describes the repeated-game expected payoﬀ enjoyed by all firms as evalu-
ated at the beginning of period two, before period-two cost types are realized.
18In practice, production costs may consist of several components that are private. Some
components, such as the price of certain raw materials or the productivity of some factors,
may fluctuate in a transitory way, whereas other components, such as the details of long-
term contracts with suppliers, may have a more persistent influence on production costs. Our
assumption of transitory shocks simplifies the analysis considerably, since otherwise a firm’s
current advertising choice could signal its cost and thereby aﬀect the beliefs that rival
firms carry into the following period. Athey and Bagwell (2008) consider a model of price
collusion in the case where production costs are persistent over time and privately observed.
Finally, our analysis can be easily extended to incorporate persistent cost shocks that are
public and apply symmetrically to all firms in an industry.
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This payoﬀ is allowed to depend on the first-period advertising realization
a ≡ (a1, ..., aN) ∈ RN+ .
Under this approach, for any given symmetric public strategy profile s, we
may ignore subscript i (as in the static model) and denote the interim-stage
first-period profit for firm i of type θ as Π(A(θ), θ;A) ≡ R(A(θ), θ;A)−A(θ).
At the interim-stage in the first period, firm i’s expected continuation value
may be denoted as v(A(θ);A) ≡ Eθ−i [v(A(θ),A(θ−i))], where A(θ−i) denotes
the (N−1)-tuple of advertising selections by firms other than iwhen these firms
all use the schedule A. We may now use Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A) to repre-
sent a firm’s interim-stage payoﬀ from a symmetric public strategy profile s. A
firm’s expected payoﬀ from s is then given as Eθ [Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A)].
The set of optimal SPPE can be characterized by solving a “factored pro-
gram.” In particular, we may choose an advertising schedule and a continuation-
value function to maximize the expected payoﬀ to a firm subject to feasibility
and incentive constraints.
Factored Program: The program chooses an advertising schedule A and a
continuation-value function v to maximize
Eθ [Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A)]
subject to: (i) for all a, v(a) ∈ V , and (ii) for any deviation bA,
Eθ [Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A)] ≥ Eθ[Π( bA(θ), θ;A) + δv( bA(θ);A)].
A key implication of the dynamic programming approach is that the set of
optimal SPPE can be characterized by solving the Factored Program. Specif-
ically, let s∗ = {s∗, ..., s∗} be a symmetric public strategy profile with the
corresponding factorization (A∗, v∗). Then, s∗ is an optimal SPPE if and only
if (A∗, v∗) solves the Factored Program.
We next follow Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004),who show
that existing tools from (static) mechanism design theory can be used to find
the optimal factorization. To this end, we rewrite the Factored Program as an
Interim Program. The latter program utilizes interim-stage profit and parses
the incentive constraint into two kinds: (i) the “on-schedule” constraint that
each firm truthfully selects the advertising level prescribed for its cost type,
and (ii) the “oﬀ-schedule” constraint that each firm cannot gain by choosing
an advertising level that is not assigned to any cost type.
Interim Program: The program chooses A and v to maximize
Eθ [Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A)]
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(i) On-schedule incentive compatibility: ∀bθ 6= θ,
∀θ−i, v(A(bθ),A(θ−i)) ∈ V
∀θ, Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A) ≥ Π(A(bθ), θ;A) + δv(A(bθ);A)
(ii) Oﬀ-schedule incentive compatibility: ∀ba /∈ A([θ, θ]),
∀θ−i, v(ba,A(θ−i)) ∈ V
∀θ, Π(A(θ), θ;A) + δv(A(θ);A) ≥ Π(ba, θ;A) + δv(ba;A).
Following Athey et al. (2004), we next relax the Interim Program in two
ways. First, we ignore the oﬀ-schedule constraints by assuming that δ is suﬃ-
ciently high so that no oﬀ-schedule deviation is profitable. Second, we relax the
on-schedule constraints by replacing v(A(bθ),A(θ−i)) ∈ V with v(A(bθ);A) ≤
supV . The relaxed constraint thus requires only that the expected continua-
tion value does not exceed the supremum of SPPE. When the constraints are
relaxed in this way, we have the Relaxed Program.
To facilitate connection with tools from mechanism design theory, we next
re-write the Relaxed Program using direct-form notation. Let Π(bθ, θ;A) ≡
Π(A(bθ), θ;A), M(bθ;A) ≡M(A(bθ);A) and R(bθ, θ;A) ≡ R(A(bθ), θ;A). We also
define W (bθ) ≡ δ[supV − v(A(bθ);A)]. For instance, W (bθ) > 0 means that
the expected continuation value falls below the value supV subsequent to a
firm’s choice of A(bθ). A continuation-value reduction represents a “war” that
involves an increase of advertising expenses in the future. We may now state
the Relaxed Program in terms of the choice of the current-period advertising
schedule A and the “punishment” functionW that maximizes expected payoﬀ
subject to on-schedule constraints:
Relaxed Program: The program chooses A and W to maximize
Eθ [R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ)]
subject to:
∀θ, W (θ) ≥ 0
(On-IC) ∀θ,bθ, R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ) ≥ R(bθ, θ;A)−A(bθ)−W (bθ).
To see that the Relaxed Program is indeed a relaxation of the Interim Pro-
gram, suppose that (A, v) satisfies the constraints of the Interim Program. Let
us now translate (A, v) into (A,W ) via W (bθ) ≡ δ[supV − v(A(bθ);A)]. Using
this translation, it is now easy to confirm that (A,W ) satisfies the constraints
of the Relaxed Program and that the Interim and Relaxed Programs rank fac-
torizations (A, v) in the same way. Therefore, if we find a solution (A,W ) to
subject to:
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the Relaxed Program, and if that solution can be expressed as a translation of
some (A, v) that satisfies all of the constraints of the Interim Program, then
this (A, v) is the factorization of an optimal SPPE.
Our next step is to identify an important situation in which the solution to
the Relaxed Program can be translated back into an optimal SPPE factoriza-
tion.
Proposition 2. (Stationarity) Suppose that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) solves the Re-
laxed Program. Then there exists bδ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ≥ bδ, there
exists an optimal SPPE which is stationary, wherein firms use A∗ after all
equilibrium-path histories, and A∗ solves the following program: maximize
Eθ[R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)] subject to ∀θ,bθ, R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) ≥ R(bθ, θ;A)−A(bθ).
To prove this proposition, we follow the steps used in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 in Athey et al. (2004). In particular, we note two implications of the
assumption that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) solves the Relaxed Program. First, following
the discussion just above, (A∗, v∗ ≡ supV ) is then a solution to the Interim
Program, provided that this factorization satisfies the additional constraints
of the Interim Program. We may therefore conclude that (A∗, v∗ ≡ supV )
achieves a (weakly) higher payoﬀ than can be achieved by any SPPE factoriza-
tion. Thus, Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A∗) + δ supV ] ≥ supV . Second, if firms are suﬃciently
patient, then the repeated play of A∗ in each period along the equilibrium
path, with appropriate punishments oﬀ the equilibrium path, is in fact an
SPPE. Given that W ∗ ≡ 0, A∗ satisfies (On-IC) on a period-by-period ba-
sis. Likewise, A∗ satisfies the on-schedule incentive constraint of the Interim
Program on a period-by-period basis (i.e., when the continuation value does
not vary with the on-schedule advertising level). The oﬀ-schedule incentive
constraint of the Interim Program is also satisfied, provided that δ is suﬃ-
ciently high. Repeated play of the (noncooperative) advertising equilibrium
of the static game is always an SPPE of the repeated game and may be used
as the punishment that follows any oﬀ-schedule deviation.19 Thus, when δ
is suﬃciently high, Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A∗)] /(1 − δ) ≤ supV . Using the two inequal-
ities, we conclude that the repeated play of A∗ is then an optimal SPPE:
supV = Eθ[Π(θ, θ;A∗)]/(1− δ).
Hence, if a solution of the Relaxed Program is (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0), and thus
does not involve wars (i.e., is stationary), and if firms are suﬃciently patient,
then supV is in fact in V . Further, an associated optimal SPPE can be easily
characterized. Firms simply use the schedule A∗ in each period, where A∗
is the solution to the static program presented in Proposition 2. This result
19We show below in Lemma 2 that A∗ achieves strictly higher expected profit than does the
advertising equilibrium of the static game.
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guides our subsequent analysis. Below, we use mechanism-design tools to
characterize the (A,W ) pairs that satisfy (On-IC) in the Relaxed Program.
In the next section, we show that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) is always a solution to the
Relaxed Program, and we also characterize A∗.
Consider now (On-IC) from the Relaxed Program. As the following lemma
indicates, this constraint may be stated in a more useful way.
Lemma 1. (A,W ) satisfies on-schedule incentive compatibility (On-IC) if
and only if ∀θ (i) A(θ) is nonincreasing and (ii)
θ,R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ) = R( θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ)+
Z θ
θ
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx.
(3)
The proof of this result is standard in the mechanism-design literature and
is therefore omitted.20 The lemma indicates that the interim-stage expected
payoﬀ for a firm with period-one type θ is comprised of a payoﬀ-at-the-top
expression (i.e., R(θ, θ;A)− A(θ) −W (θ)) and an integral that indicates the
expected information rents for this type in the first period.
The repeated game allows for a wide range of behaviors, even within the
category of stationary SPPE. For example, as noted, in each period of the
repeated game, firms may use the advertising equilibrium of the static model
stated in Proposition 1. Further, if firms strictly prefer pooling at zero adver-
tising to using the advertising equilibrium of the static game and they are suf-
ficiently patient, then they can enforce a stationary SPPE in which they pool
with zero advertising. Any pooling arrangement trivially satisfies on-schedule
incentive compatibility, and patient firms will not deviate (oﬀ schedule) to a
positive advertising level if such a deviation induces a future war that entails
a reversion to the advertising equilibrium. Likewise, under appropriate con-
ditions, stationary SPPE exist in which firms use advertising schedules that
are nonincreasing step functions. More generally, stationary SPPE may entail
advertising schedules with intervals of pooling as well as intervals of separation.
4 Optimal Collusion for Patient Firms
In this section, we characterize optimal SPPE, assuming firms are suﬃciently
20To confirm that (On-IC) implies that M(θ;A) is nonincreasing, we may fix any two
types (say, θ1 and θ2), express the two (On-IC) constraints under which a firm with one
type does not gain from mimicking the behavior assigned to the other type, and then
add the two constraints. Given the consumer search rules, M(θ;A) is nonincreasing if
and only if A(θ) is nonincreasing. A local optimality condition, Π1(bθ, θ;A) = 0 for bθ = θ,
must also hold, and the application of an appropriate envelope theorem (Milgrom and
Segal, 2002) thus yields (3). Together, the two conditions are suﬃcient for (On-IC), due
to the single-crossing property of the model.
patient so that oﬀ-schedule constraints hold. We report our findings in five
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steps. First, we show that equilibrium-path wars are not necessary for opti-
mal SPPE. Second, using Proposition 2, we report conditions under which an
optimal SPPE exists that is stationary, wherein firms pool at zero advertis-
ing in all periods. Third, we show that the same conditions for the second
finding ensure that any optimal SPPE is stationary and involves pooling at
zero advertising in all periods. Fourth, in a more general setting, we show
that any optimal SPPE involves at least partial pooling. Fifth, we show that
an optimal SPPE with partial pooling may involve quite a small number of
pooling intervals.
4.1 No Wars
In this subsection, we establish a substitutability between current advertising
and future wars, and we thereby conclude that the relaxed program has a
no-war solution, (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0). Accordingly, for suﬃciently patient firms,
we establish that wars are not necessary for optimal SPPE. When firms are
suﬃciently patient, we may thus use the program specified in Proposition 2 to
characterize the advertising schedule that is used in an optimal and stationary
SPPE.
Suppose that a scheme (A,W ) satisfies (On-IC) in the Relaxed Program.
Then, we say that an alternative scheme (A∗,W ∗) is point-wise equivalent to
(A,W ) if the scheme satisfies (On-IC) and preserves the market-share alloca-
tion and interim-stage profit: ∀θ,
M(θ;A∗) =M(θ;A) and R(θ, θ;A∗)−A∗(θ)−W ∗(θ) = R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ).
(4)
We now establish a substitutability between current advertising and future
wars: for any (A,W ) that satisfies (On-IC), we can set A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ)
and construct a no-war scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) that is point-wise equivalent to
(A,W ).
Proposition 3. (Substitutability) Assume that (A,W ) satisfies (On-IC) in
the Relaxed Program. A no-war scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) is point-wise equivalent
to (A,W ) if and only if A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ).
Proof. The proof of necessity follows directly from the definition of point-
wise equivalence. If the no-war scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) is point-wise equivalent
to (A,W ), then M(θ;A∗) =M(θ;A) and thus R(θ, θ;A∗) = R(θ, θ;A). Using
(4), it then follows that A∗(θ) = A(θ) +W (θ).
For the proof of suﬃciency, we assume that (A,W ) satisfies (On-IC) and
define A∗ by A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ)+W (θ). We must show that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) satisfies
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(On-IC) and preserves the original market shares and interim-stage profit un-
der (A,W ). Observe first that, if (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) preserves the original market
shares, M(θ;A∗) = M(θ;A) for all θ, then it satisfies (On-IC) in the Re-
laxed Program and preserves the original interim-stage profit in (4). Hence,
it suﬃces to show that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) preserves the original market shares un-
der (A,W ). To prove this part, we decompose the market-share allocation of
(A,W ) into three components: sorting intervals, pooling intervals and jump
points. We then show that the intervals on which (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) engages in
sorting (pooling) are consistent with the intervals on which (A,W ) engages in
sorting (pooling), and we also show that (A,W ) and (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) jump at
the same points.
First, suppose that (A,W ) entails sorting for θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] ⊂ [θ, θ]. Using (3),
we find the interim profit for θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]:
R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ) = R(θ2, θ2;A)−A(θ2)−W (θ2)+
Z θ2
θ
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx
(5)
where M(x;A) = UN + [1− F (x)]N−1I. This equation can be rewritten as
A(θ) +W (θ)− [A(θ2) +W (θ2)] = −
Z θ2
θ
r(p(x), x)[∂M(x;A)/∂x]dx, (6)
where ∂M(x;A)∂x = −(N − 1)[1−F (x)]N−2f(x)I < 0 for all x < θ. Using (6), we
see that A∗(θ) defined by A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ) is strictly decreasing and thus
entails sorting over θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]. Hence, A∗ preserves the original market shares
for θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]. Second, suppose that (A,W ) entails pooling for θ ∈ [θ1, θ2].
In this case, we may rewrite (5) as A(θ) +W (θ) = A(θ2) +W (θ2). Thus, for
θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], A∗ entails pooling and preserves the original market share. Third,
suppose that (A,W ) involves a jump of market-share allocation at a pointbθ ∈ [θ, θ] such that
M(bθ;A) > lim sup
θ>eθ
M(θ;A) ≡M+(bθ;A). (7)
The associated limits from the right for wars and advertising are denoted by
W+(bθ) and A+(bθ), respectively. The described jump of market-share allocation
at bθ means that A(bθ) > A+(bθ). The level of jump is determined such that the
on-schedule constraint is binding at bθ:
A(bθ) +W (bθ)− [A+(bθ) +W+(bθ)] = r(p(bθ),bθ)[M(bθ;A)−M+(bθ;A)]. (8)
Thus, by (7) and (8), A∗ entails a jump at bθ, with A∗(bθ) > A∗+(bθ).21 Given
that A∗ preserves the original market shares in pooling or sorting intervals,
21In general, if (A,W ) satisfies (On-IC), then M(θ;A) must be nonincreasing. As no
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the level of jump under A∗ is made such that the on-schedule constraint is
binding at bθ. ¥
Proposition 3 identifies a substitutability between current advertising ex-
penditures and future advertising wars. When a scheme (A,W ) satisfies (On-
IC) and requires a war (W (θ) > 0 for some θ), then we may understand that
the expected future payoﬀ is reduced due to the possibility of a future adver-
tising war. Proposition 3 indicates that we may then construct a point-wise
equivalent scheme, (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) with A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) + W (θ), in which the
possibility of a future advertising war is eliminated (W ∗ ≡ 0) and current
advertising expenditures are increased accordingly (A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ)). A
war is redundant in this sense.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 greatly simplify our analysis of the repeated
advertising game. Proposition 3 implies that, for any (A,W ) that solves
the Relaxed Program, there exists a point-wise equivalent no-war scheme,
(A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) with A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ), that also solves the Relaxed Pro-
gram. By Proposition 2, if firms are suﬃciently patient, we may conclude that
an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary and in which firms use A∗ after all
equilibrium-path histories.22 Proposition 2 also provides a program that may
be solved in order to characterize A∗.
Our next step is to write the static program identified in Proposition 2 in a
more useful form. In particular, using Lemma 1 andW ∗ ≡ 0, we may integrate
by parts and state the program that A∗ must solve as follows:
No-War Program: The program chooses A to maximize
θ,Eθ [R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)] = R( θ) +Eθθ;A)−A(
∙
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)
¸
(9)
subject to: A(θ) is nonincreasing in θ.
Notice that expected profit is characterized in the No-War Program in terms
of two components. Specifically, we may understand the RHS of (9) as being
comprised of the “profit at the top” (i.e., the current-period profit earned by
a firm with cost type θ) and the expected information rents.23
type would “pay” more for less market share, incentive compatibility thus requires that
A(θ)+W (θ) is nonincreasing as well. It follows that A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ)+W (θ) is nonincreasing.
22The arguments developed here may also be applied to the class of SPPE in which advertis-
ing entails full sorting over [θ, θ] in all periods. In particular, an optimal SPPE within
the full sorting class is the stationary (no-war) SPPE in which firms use the advertis-
ing equilibrium of the static game in all periods. Thus, for firms to improve on the ad-
vertising equilibrium of the static game, they must use an advertising scheme that en-
tails some pooling.
23In comparison to the static program identified in Proposition 2, the No-War Program
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Based on our discussion to this point, we may now state the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose (A,W ) solves the Relaxed Program, and define
A∗ by A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ). Then (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) solves the Relaxed Program,
and so A∗ solves the No-War Program. (ii) Suppose A∗ solves the No-War
Program and (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) satisfies (On-IC). Then (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) solves the
Relaxed Program, and so there exists bδ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ≥ bδ, there
exists an optimal SPPE which is stationary, wherein firms use A∗ after all
equilibrium-path histories.
We note that all of our findings to this point are quite general, in that
they hold for any demand function D and also for any distribution function
F . Further restrictions are required below, however, in order to characterize
the advertising schedule A∗ that solves the No-War Program.
4.2 Optimal SPPE: Pooling at Zero Advertising
In this subsection, we characterize A∗ that solves the No-War Program. We
encounter a related problem in the comparison between the advertising and
random equilibria in the static model. Bagwell and Lee (2010) provide condi-
tions under which expected profit is higher in the random equilibrium than in
the advertising equilibrium. Generalizing beyond that particular comparison,
we now show that the same conditions ensure that pooling at zero advertising
in fact solves the No-War Program.
Proposition 5. For δ suﬃciently high, if F is log-concave and demand is
suﬃciently inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently small,
then there exists an optimal SPPE that is stationary, wherein firms pool at
zero advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
Proof. Using part (ii) of Proposition 4, we must show that A∗ ≡ 0 solves
the No-War Program, if F is log-concave and demand is suﬃciently inelastic
allows for a larger feasible set of advertising functions. This is because the No-War Program
uses (3) to re-state the objective function but does not separately use (3) to restrict the
feasible set. Accordingly, in some cases, the No-War Program may admit a solution A
such that (A,W ≡ 0) does not satisfy (On-IC). In our model of advertising, however, for any
solution to the No-War Program that does not satisfy (On-IC), we can deliver the same profit
at the top and the same market share allocation (and thus the same expected information
rents) with another solution A∗ to the No-War Program such that (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) does
satisfy (On-IC). Hence, one of the solutions to the No-War Program is a solution to the static
program in Proposition 2. In our analysis of solutions to the No-War Program below,
we are careful to focus on solutions that satisfy the on-schedule incentive constraint and thus
that also solve the static program in Proposition 2.
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or if θ − θ is suﬃciently small. Demonstration of this result is suﬃcient,
since (A∗ ≡ 0,W ∗ ≡ 0) clearly satisfies (On-IC). Let A denote any other
nonincreasing scheme. Note that M(θ;A) is then nonincreasing, and recall
that M(θ;A∗) ≡ 1N . Consider first the profit at the top term in (9). If A
entails any sorting, then M(θ;A∗) = 1N > M(θ;A) and A
∗( θ).θ) = 0 ≤ A(
Alternatively, if A is a pooling scheme (at some positive level of advertising),
then M(θ;A∗) = 1N = M(θ;A) and A
∗(θ) = 0 < A(θ). In either case, the
profit at the top is strictly higher under A∗ than under A. Consider second
the expected information rents term in (9). For the special case in which θ− θ
approaches zero, expected information rents converge to zero; thus, the profit
at the top term dominates if the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently
small. For the general case in which the support may be large, we define the
distribution function G(θ;A) under A:
G(θ;A) ≡
R θ
θ M(x;A)f(x)dxR θ
θ M(x;A)f(x)dx
. (10)
The distribution function G(θ;A∗) is similarly defined.24 The denominators
of G(θ;A) and G(θ;A∗) represent the (ex ante) expected market share, which
equals 1N . SinceM(θ;A
∗) = 1N crossesM(θ;A) from below, G(θ;A
∗) first-order
stochastically dominates G(θ;A): G(θ;A∗) ≤ G(θ;A).25 Thus, if D(p(θ))Ff (θ)
is nondecreasing, thenZ θ
θ
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)dG (θ;A∗) ≥
Z θ
θ
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)dG (θ;A) . (11)
This inequality can be rewritten as
Eθ
∙
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A∗)
¸
≥ Eθ
∙
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)
¸
. (12)
Thus, if D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing, then expected information rents are
weakly higher under A∗ than under A. The termD(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing
when F is log-concave (Ff (θ) is nondecreasing in θ) and demand is suﬃciently
inelastic. ¥
Proposition 5 establishes conditions under which an optimal SPPE exists,
wherein firms pool at zero advertising in all periods. As indicated in part
24With our definition of the distribution function and analysis of expected information rents
for the general case in which the support may be large, we build on arguments made by Athey
et al (2004) in their analysis of price collusion.
25If A is a pooling scheme, then M(θ;A∗) crosses M(θ;A) from below in a weak sense.
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(ii) of Proposition 4, the key step is to establish conditions under which the
No-War Program is solved with an advertising schedule that entails pooling at
zero advertising. Profit at the top is uniquely maximized when firms pool at
zero advertising. The maximization of expected information rents, however, is
more subtle. When D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing, expected information rents
are higher when market share is taken from lower types and redistributed to
higher types. Since an incentive-compatible market share allocation function
must be nonincreasing, expected information rents are then maximized when
the advertising schedule entails pooling, so that the market share allocation
function is constant at 1N . But whether or not D(p(θ))
F
f (θ) is nondecreasing
depends on the resolution of conflicting forces. On the one hand, if F is log-
concave, then Ff (θ) is increasing in θ.
26 On the other hand, when demand is
downward sloping, D(p(θ)) is decreasing in θ. Thus, if F is log-concave and
demand is suﬃciently inelastic, so that D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing, then
pooling at zero advertising is an optimal SPPE for patient firms.27 Addition-
ally, in the special case in which the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently
small, the No-War Program is solved under pooling at zero advertising, since
then the expected information rents can be made suﬃciently small that their
sign is immaterial.
We now summarize our findings. Propositions 2-4 confirm at a general level
that equilibrium-path wars are not necessary for optimality: for any D and F ,
any optimal SPPE payoﬀ can be achieved by an optimal SPPE that is station-
ary, wherein firms use A∗ for all equilibrium histories. We also characterize
an optimal SPPE that is stationary. Proposition 5 reports conditions under
which an optimal SPPE that is stationary entails A∗ ≡ 0 for all equilibrium
histories. Building on these findings, we now show that, under the conditions
stated in Proposition 5, any optimal SPPE is stationary and entails A∗ ≡ 0
for all equilibrium histories. In this way, we establish the uniqueness of the
optimal SPPE presented in Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. For δ suﬃciently high, if F is log-concave and demand is
suﬃciently inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently small,
then any optimal SPPE is stationary, wherein firms pool at zero advertising
following all equilibrium-path histories.
Proof. Fix an SPPE in which firms do not pool at zero following all equilib-
rium path histories. We may translate the factorization of this SPPE into a
26The assumption of log-concavity of F is common in the contract literature and is satisfied
by many distribution functions.
27We discuss these conflicting considerations in greater detail in our companion paper
(Bagwell and Lee, 2010).
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scheme (A,W ) that satisfies the constraints of the Relaxed Program. Using
Proposition 3, the scheme (A,W ) is point-wise equivalent to a no-war scheme
(A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0), where A∗ ≡ A + W . Given the assumed properties of the
SPPE, A∗ is not identically zero. As established in the proof of Proposition
5, if F is log-concave and demand is suﬃciently inelastic, or if the support of
possible cost types is suﬃciently small, then the No-War Program is uniquely
solved when advertising is identically equal to zero. Under these conditions,
therefore, the posited no-war scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0) can be strictly improved
upon by an alternative no-war scheme in which firms do pool at zero adver-
tising. Further, for δ suﬃciently high, we know from Proposition 4 that the
alternative scheme corresponds to an optimal SPPE that exists, is stationary
and entails firms pooling at zero advertising following all equilibrium-path his-
tories. Thus, under the stated conditions, a stationary SPPE exists with the
described properties which generates a strictly higher expected ex ante profit
for firms than does any other SPPE. ¥
While we allow for a wide range of SPPE advertising behaviors in the re-
peated game, we show that important conditions exist under which advertising
behavior in any optimal SPPE takes a remarkably simple form: along the equi-
librium path, no firm advertises in any period. Intuitively, the conditions in the
proposition favor pooling. Wars are thus redundant in this context, since the
associated payoﬀs can be achieved by pooling at a higher level of advertising
in the current period. Furthermore, pooling at a positive level of advertising
in the current period is a wasteful means for firms of achieving the associated
market share allocation. They can achieve the same allocation more profitably
by pooling at zero advertising.
Propositions 5 and 6 thus provide a formal confirmation of the idea that,
even if advertising is legal and informed consumers are responsive to it, firms
may eliminate advertising as part of an optimal self-enforcing collusive agree-
ment. When firms collude in this way, the welfare of consumers is reduced
from the welfare that they enjoy in the non-cooperative advertising equilib-
rium. Given that the induced distribution of monopoly prices is not altered,
uninformed consumers’ surplus remains unaﬀected. The collusive agreement,
however, prevents informed consumers from using advertising to infer the iden-
tity of the lowest-cost, and thus the lowest-price, firm in the market. The
average transaction price is thus higher when advertising is eliminated as part
of a collusive agreement among firms.
We emphasize that Propositions 5 and 6 may hold even when demand is
elastic. First, observe that these propositions hold for any demand function,
if the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently small and δ is suﬃciently
high. Second, consider the constant-elasticity demand function, D(p) = p−,
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and suppose that demand is elastic (i.e.,  > 1). If θ is distributed uniformly
over [θ, θ] where θ > 0, then D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing when θ/[θ− θ] > ;
thus, any optimal SPPE for patient firms entails pooling at zero advertising,
provided that the elasticity of demand, , does not exceed a critical level where
this level is higher when the support of possible cost types is smaller.
4.3 Optimal SPPE: Partial Pooling
While Proposition 6 isolates an important set of conditions under which any
optimal SPPE takes a very simple form, it is also interesting to consider the
form that optimal SPPE may take when these conditions fail. In this sub-
section, without requiring that D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is everywhere nondecreasing, we
establish that optimal SPPE for patient firms involves at least partial pool-
ing.28
A diﬃculty with solving the No-War Program is that the market share func-
tion and the associated expected profit are conditional on the entire advertising
schedule. Our analysis therefore proceeds from the fact that the entire adver-
tising schedule can be decomposed into three diﬀerent kinds of components:
sorting, pooling and jumps. An advertising schedule has a discontinuity (a
jump) between two pooling intervals and between sorting and pooling inter-
vals. The level of jump at a point is determined by the binding (On-IC) at
that point. Consider the simplest case that has three parts: from the lowest
step (from the highest type), a schedule has a pooling interval with A(θ) = 0
on (y, θ] and then jumps to a sorting interval [θ, y]. This nonincreasing scheme
has the following expected profit:29
Eθ [R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ)] = r
¡
p(θ), θ
¢
M(θ;A) +
Z y
θ
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M (θ;A) dF (θ)
+
Z θ
y
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M (θ;A) dF (θ). (13)
The market share allocation functions are given by M(θ;A) = UN + [1 −
F (θ)]N−1I for θ ∈ [θ, y] and M(θ;A) = UN + [1 − F (y)]N−1
I
N for θ ∈ (y, θ].
The level of jump is determined such that the on-schedule constraint is bind-
28As above, we solve the No-War Program to characterize optimal SPPE. If the solution to
the program involves positive advertising as in partial pooling, then optimal SPPE may take
the form of a stationary or non-stationary equilibrium. The reason is that firms may then
allocate advertising expenses across periods, because of the substitutability between current-
period advertising and future advertising wars. If firms implement a non-stationary SPPE,
then they move between cooperative and war phases in their advertising conduct.
29The expression for expected profit is derived in the Appendix.
ing at y:
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A(y) = r(p(y), y)[1− F (y)]N−1I
µ
1− 1
N
¶
. (14)
When y → θ, the scheme approaches the fully sorting scheme. Given the
assumption that p(θ) > θ and f(θ) > 0, we may diﬀerentiate (13) with respect
to y and confirm that fully sorting can be improved upon by a scheme that
has at least a small pooling interval at the top, (y, θ].
We extend this result and develop two general points. First, any no-war
scheme that has a sorting interval at the top can be improved upon by an al-
ternative no-war scheme that has a pooling interval at the top (i.e., an interval
(y, θ] on which A(θ) = 0).30 Second, if firms are suﬃciently patient, then any
optimal SPPE entails a pooling interval at the top. For the proof of this second
part, assume that an optimal SPPE exists that entails a sorting interval at the
top. We may translate the associated factorization into a scheme (A,W ) that
satisfies the constraints of the Relaxed Program. From here, we can construct
a point-wise equivalent scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0). Since this no-war scheme also
has a sorting interval at the top, it can be improved upon by an alternative
no-war scheme that has a pooling interval at the top. For suﬃciently patient
firms, we can then support an SPPE in which the advertising schedule from
the alternative no-war scheme is used in each period along the equilibrium
path. Our initial assumption is thus contradicted.
Lemma 2. For any F and D, if δ is suﬃciently high, then any optimal SPPE
has a pooling interval (y, θ] on which A(θ) = 0.
To present a more comprehensive characterization of optimal SPPE, we
next assume that the entire advertising schedule A is represented by K fi-
nite intervals, [[θ1, θ2], (θ2, θ3], ..., (θK , θK+1]], where θ1 = θ and θK+1 = θ, and
θk < θk+1. Referring to Proposition 4 and Lemma 2, we now restrict atten-
tion to stationary (no-war) SPPE which entail pooling at zero advertising on
an interval at the top. Straightforward arguments as above ensure that the
findings below hold for any optimal SPPE for patient firms. If the schedule A
solves the No-War Program and (A,W ≡ 0) satisfies (On-IC), then expected
profit is
Eθ [R (θ, θ;A)−A (θ)] = r
¡
p(θ), θ
¢
M(θ;A) (15)
+
KX
k=1
Z θk+1
θk
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)dF (θ).
30The proof for this part is provided by the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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The market share for θ ∈ (θK , θK+1] is M(θ;A) = UN + [1 − F (θK)]N−1
I
N . If
(θk, θk+1] is a pooling interval, then, for θ ∈ (θk, θk+1],
M(θ;A) =
U
N
+
N−1X
j=0
µ
N − 1
j
¶
1
j + 1
[F (θk+1)− F (θk)]j [1− F (θk+1)]N−j−1 I.
(16)
If (θk, θk+1] is a sorting interval, then, for θ ∈ (θk, θk+1], M(θ;A) = UN +
[1− F (θ)]N−1 I. The expected market share over the entire interval is 1N :
KX
k=1
Z θk+1
θk
M(θ;A)f(θ)dθ =
1
N
. (17)
Recall that, at any point at which the advertising schedule has a jump, we
determine the level of the jump to be such that (IC-On) binds at that point.
We next show that optimal SPPE reflect forces in favor of pooling in a range
of cost types where D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing.
31 Suppose that a scheme
A is sorting and D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing in a range (θi, θi+1]. As we
show in detail in the Appendix, we can then construct an alternative scheme
A∗ such that A∗(θ) preserves the original scheme A(θ) for θ > θi+1 and A∗(θ)
is pooling for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and makes a parallel shift from A(θ) for θ ≤ θi.32
Given that A∗(θ) replaces sorting with pooling for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1], the original
market shares under A are aﬀected by A∗ for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]. For the aﬀected
range (θi, θi+1], we define the distribution function under A∗:
G(θi, θi+1;A∗) ≡
R θ
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dxR θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx
for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]. (18)
The distribution G (θi, θi+1;A) is analogously defined under A. We confirm
in the Appendix that the denominators of the two distribution functions are
the same. Since M(θ;A∗) crosses M (θ;A) from below in the range (θi, θi+1],
G(θi, θi+1;A∗) first-order stochastically dominates G (θi, θi+1;A). We may
invoke the argument used in the proof of Proposition 5 and compare the
information-rent terms:Z θi+1
θi
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A∗)dF (θ) ≥
Z θi+1
θi
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)dF (θ). (19)
31Our analysis refers to two related intervals: (i) the interval of θ on which A(θ) is defined
and (ii) the interval of θ on which D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is defined. To avoid confusion, we hereafter
refer to the latter interval as the “range” of θ.
32The definition of A∗ and associated proofs are detailed in the proof of Proposition 7 in the
Appendix.
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Since A∗ is designed to preserve the original market share under A other than
in the range (θi, θi+1], the expected profit remains the same except for the
information-rent terms in (19). Hence, we conclude that the expected profit
is weakly higher under A∗ than under A.
This finding can be readily extended. Suppose that D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is non-
decreasing for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and is strictly increasing for some interior type
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1). In this case, expected profit is strictly higher under A∗ than un-
der A, from which it follows that no optimal SPPE is sorting for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1].33
Likewise, we may establish that any optimal SPPE involves pooling at the bot-
tom (i.e., for a range [θ, x] where x ≤ θ). This is because, for any F and D,
D(p(θ))Ff (θ) strictly increases at the neighborhood of θ, given f(θ) > 0.
We summarize our findings as follows:
Proposition 7. Assume that δ is suﬃciently high. (i) For any F and D,
any optimal SPPE involves pooling at the bottom and at the top. (ii) If
D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and is strictly increasing for
some interior type in this range, then no optimal SPPE entails sorting for
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1].
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 7 has two implications. First,
since the repeated play of the advertising equilibrium of the static game is
a stationary SPPE that entails full sorting, Proposition 7 ensures that any
optimal SPPE for patient firms involves at least partial pooling and strictly
improves upon the repeated use of the advertising equilibrium.34 Second, if
a sorting interval is ever used by patient firms, then it is restricted to an
“intermediate range” in which D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nonincreasing.
4.4 Optimal SPPE: At Most Two Pooling Intervals
In Proposition 7 of the previous subsection, we show that optimal SPPE ex-
hibit robust forces in favor of at least partial pooling. In this subsection, we
further establish that optimal SPPE may use quite a small number of pooling
steps and significantly restrict the use of sorting intervals. To develop these
points, we now restrict attention to stationary (no-war) SPPE that entail pool-
ing at the top and at the bottom. We note, though, that our findings presented
below hold for any optimal SPPE.
Our analysis employs the following assumption on F and D.
33In other words, for this case, in an optimal SPPE, it cannot be the true that, for all
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1], A(θ) is strictly decreasing.
34Recall that the sub-optimality of the advertising equilibrium is also established above
in the discussion leading up to Lemma 2.
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Assumption 1. D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is strictly quasiconcave with a maximizer θ
∗ ∈
(θ, θ].
Assumption 1 holds if D(p(θ))Ff (θ) has a unique interior maximizer θ
∗ ∈ (θ, θ)
and is strictly increasing for θ < θ∗ and strictly decreasing for θ > θ∗. It also
includes the case where D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is everywhere strictly increasing with a
maximizer, θ. Given that D(p(θ)) is strictly decreasing in θ, the assumption is
satisfied in a wide range of settings when F is log-concave. For example, As-
sumption 1 holds if F is the uniform distribution on [θ, θ] andD(p) = (α−βp)γ,
where θ ≥ 0, (α, β, γ) > 0 and α − βθ > 0. Notice that D(p) is linear when
γ = 1 and is convex (concave) when γ > 1 (γ < 1). Similarly, Assumption 1
holds if F is the uniform distribution on [θ, θ] and D(p) = p−, where θ > 0
and  > 1. Using the two demand functions just presented, we can also nu-
merically confirm that Assumption 1 is satisfied for a substantially wide range
of parameters when F is a “truncated” normal distribution.35 Assumption
1 may be violated in cases where demand is very convex and cost types are
distributed with low variance.36
We now show that, under Assumption 1, any optimal SPPE for patient
firms entails at most two pooling intervals. For notational simplicity, let φ(θ) ≡
D(p(θ))Ff (θ). We focus here on the case in which φ(θ) is strictly quasiconcave
with an interior maximizer θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ). As we show in detail in the Appendix,
we may present our findings in two steps. First, an optimal SPPE cannot
have two separate pooling steps within a range where φ0(θ) > 0. If a scheme
includes two separate pooling intervals, (θi, y] and (y, θi+1], within a range
(θi, θi+1] where φ0(θ) > 0, then there is an alternative scheme that replaces
the two pooling steps with one pooling step for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]. Using the
distributions for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] as in (18), we find that the expected profit is
strictly higher under the alternative scheme. By the same token, other than
the pooling interval at the top, an optimal SPPE cannot include a separate
pooling interval within a range (θi, θi+1] where φ0(θ) < 0. If a scheme has
35The density function of a normal random variable with mean and variance, μ and σ2,
is given by λ(θ) ≡ 1√
2πσ2
e−
1
2 (
θ−μ
σ )
2
where −∞ < θ <∞. The distribution function is Λ(θ) =R θ
−∞ λ(x)dx. The density function under a truncated normal distribution is defined as
f(θ) = λ(θ)
Λ(θ)−Λ(θ) if θ ≤ θ ≤ θ, and f(θ) = 0 otherwise. The associated distribution
function is F (θ) =
R θ
θ f(x)dx.
36We have numerically confirmed that the assumption is violated only in a very limited
range of parameters, as in the case where D(p) = (α−βp)γ is convex and F is normal with a
very low variance (e.g., D(p(θ))Ff (θ) has two local maximizers when θ = 0, θ ≈ 0.5, α = 1,
β = 2, γ = 2, μ = 0.25 and σ2 = 0.01). Note that we set α = 1 to be consistent
with the assumption of unit mass of consumers.
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a pooling interval (y, z] within (θi, θi+1] where φ0(θ) < 0, then there is an
alternative scheme that replaces pooling with sorting for θ ∈ (y, z]. We also
find that the expected profit is strictly higher under the alternative scheme.
Second, an optimal SPPE cannot have three pooling steps; equivalently, it
cannot have an intermediate pooling interval.37 Remember that an optimal
SPPE cannot include two separate pooling steps or any sorting interval within
[θ, θ∗] where φ0(θ) > 0, and that, other than at the top, an optimal SPPE
cannot have a separate pooling step within (θ∗, θ] where φ0(θ) < 0. Thus,
the one remaining possibility for an optimal SPPE candidate A to have three
pooling steps is that the scheme has pooling steps, [θ, y], (y, z] and (z, θ], such
that θ < y < θ∗ < z < θ.38 Consider an alternative scheme A∗ that has
pooling steps, [θ, y∗], (y∗, z] and (z, θ], such that θ < θ∗ < y∗ < z < θ. The
alternative scheme lengthens the first pooling step beyond the range [θ, θ∗)
where φ0(θ) > 0. The original market shares under A are aﬀected by A∗ for
θ ∈ [θ, z]. Given the aﬀected range [θ, z], the market shares for types at the
bottom [θ, y] and at the top (y∗, z] are lower under A∗ than under A, while
the market shares for types in the intermediate range (y, y∗] are higher under
A∗ than under A. We define the distribution function under A∗:
G(θ, z;A∗) ≡
R θ
θ M(x;A
∗)f(x)dxR z
θ M(x;A
∗)f(x)dx
for θ ∈ [θ, z]. (20)
The distribution G(θ, z;A) is similarly defined under A. The two functions
have the same denominators. Diﬀerentiation of the functions with respect
to θ shows that, given the range [θ, z], the slope of G(θ, z;A∗) is flatter
(steeper) than that of G (θ, z;A) at the bottom [θ, y] and at the top (y∗, z] (in
the intermediate range (y, y∗]). The point y∗ is chosen such that G(θ, z;A∗)
crosses G(θ, z;A) from below at the point θ∗.39 Letting ∆(θ) ≡ G (θ, z;A) −
G(θ, z;A∗), we then compare the aﬀected information-rent terms:Z z
θ
φ(θ)dG(θ, z;A∗)−
Z z
θ
φ(θ)dG (θ, z;A) (21)
=
Z θ∗
θ
φ0(θ)∆(θ)dθ +
Z z
θ∗
φ0(θ)∆(θ)dθ > 0.
37From the analysis below, it follows that an optimal SPPE cannot have more than three
pooling steps.
38The scheme A may include a sorting interval between (y, z] and (z, θ] where φ0(θ) < 0.
The findings below are not aﬀected by this change.
39Observe that y∗ ∈ (θ∗, z). If y∗ ≤ θ∗, then G(θ, z;A∗) crosses G (θ, z;A) at type θ <
θ∗, since the slope of G(θ, z;A∗) is flatter than that of G (θ, z;A) in the range (y∗, z].
If y∗ = z, then G(θ, z;A∗) crosses G (θ, z;A) from below at the endpoint z > θ∗.
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We thus find that the expected profit is strictly higher under A∗ than under A.
Intuitively, A∗ is more suitable than A to increase the expected information
rents. In the range where φ0(θ) > 0, A∗ decreases the market share for types
below y ∈ (θ, θ∗) and increases the market share for types above y. Likewise,
in the range where φ0(θ) < 0, A∗ increases the market share for types below
y∗ ∈ (θ∗, z) and decreases the market share for types above y∗. Observe further
that, other than the pooling at the top (z, θ], A∗ includes a separate pooling
step (y∗, z] within the range (θ∗, θ] where φ0(θ) < 0. We can then construct
another alternative scheme that replaces pooling with sorting for θ ∈ (y∗, z]
and strictly improves upon the scheme A∗. Hence, an optimal SPPE cannot
have an intermediate pooling interval.
We now summarize our findings:
Proposition 8. Suppose that δ is suﬃciently high and that Assumption 1
is satisfied. (i) An optimal SPPE has at most two pooling intervals: it is
characterized by either (a) one full pooling step at zero advertising or (b)
two pooling steps with or without an intermediate sorting interval. (ii) If an
optimal SPPE ever includes an intermediate sorting interval, then it restricts
the sorting interval to a subset of the range in which D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is strictly
decreasing.
The proof is in the Appendix. For δ suﬃciently high, Proposition 8 comple-
ments the finding that an optimal SPPE must entail pooling at the bottom
and at the top. Under Assumption 1, if an optimal SPPE ever involves sort-
ing, it uses sorting only once in an intermediate range of cost types; hence, the
possible forms of optimal SPPE are characterized by the two cases specified
in Proposition 8 (i). Whether an optimal SPPE includes a sorting scheme de-
pends on the extent to which D(p(θ))Ff (θ) decreases in an intermediate range
and the magnitude of the profit at the top.40 Proposition 8 thus confirms
the idea that, under general demand functions, patient firms may use a small
number of pooling steps and restrict the use of sorting intervals as a means of
reducing the intensity of advertising competition.41 To the detriment of con-
40Suppose that D(p) = 1 − p, N = 5 and F is the uniform distribution on [0, θ]. Then,
D(p(θ))Ff (θ) =
(1−θ)θ
2 is concave with a maximizer 0.5. If θ = 0.99, then any optimal SPPE
has two pooling steps with an intermediate sorting interval approximately on (0.752, 0.962].
If θ = 0.77, then any optimal SPPE has only two pooling steps with a jump at 0.75.
If θ = 0.70, then it has a single pooling step at zero advertising.
41We can also show that Proposition 8 holds even in settings where Assumption 1 may fail.
In particular, Proposition 8 holds as well ifD(p(θ))Ff (θ) is strictly quasiconcave for θ ≤ θ
∗∗ ∈
(θ, θ) with a local maximizer θ∗ and is strictly quasiconvex for θ > θ∗ with a local minimizer
θ∗∗ > θ∗.
31
Bagwell and Lee: Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets
Brought to you by | Singapore Management University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/2/15 3:34 PM
sumer welfare, such a collusive agreement restricts the informed consumers’
capacity to locate the lowest available price in the market.
5 Oﬀ-Schedule Incentive Constraints
Up to this point, we have ignored oﬀ-schedule incentive constraints by assum-
ing that firms are suﬃciently patient. We now consider oﬀ-schedule constraints
and characterize the critical discount factor above which they are satisfied.
Motivated by our findings above, we characterize the critical discount factor
for optimal SPPE that are stationary and entail pooling at zero advertising or
entail two pooling intervals with an intermediate sorting interval.
We first characterize the critical discount factor, bδp ∈ (0, 1), above which an
optimal SPPE exists that is stationary and entails pooling at zero advertising
(as established in Proposition 5). When firms pool at zero advertising, a firm
faces a temptation to cheat by advertising a small, positive amount, as it
thereby attracts all informed consumers rather than only its share of these
consumers. This short-term incentive to cheat must be balanced against the
long-term cost of a punishment (i.e., a reduced continuation value). Given our
focus on SPPE, such a punishment must be experienced by all firms. We thus
suppose that an oﬀ-schedule deviation of this kind triggers a reversion to the
advertising equilibrium of the static game.42 Thus, the long-term cost of an
oﬀ-schedule deviation is that the future discounted expected profit associated
with pooling at zero advertising is replaced with that associated with the
repeated play of the advertising equilibrium. In other words, if a firm cheats
on the collusive agreement to not advertise, then a breakdown in cooperation
occurs and the firms revert to the advertising equilibrium thereafter.
We now consider the type of firm for which the oﬀ-schedule constraint first
binds. Given our assumption that cost types are determined in an iid fashion
through time, a firm faces the same long-term cost of an oﬀ-schedule deviation
regardless of its current type, θ. The short-term incentive to deviate, however,
is sensitive to θ. When firms pool at zero advertising, a firm with cost type θ
has the greatest short-term incentive to defect. This type of firm values most
the increase in market share that accompanies cheating, since it has the highest
profit-if-win, r(p(θ), θ). When firms pool at zero advertising, the oﬀ-schedule
constraint is sure to hold for all θ if it holds for θ. We may thus represent the
42Other symmetric punishments, such as those that take a “carrot-stick” form, may also
be considered. Building on arguments developed by Athey et al. (2004), we can show
that the repeated play of the advertising equilibrium generates the lowest SPPE payoﬀ
when D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is everywhere nondecreasing.
oﬀ-schedule constraint for this situation as follows:
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r(p(θ), θ)I
µ
1− 1
N
¶
≤ δ
1− δ (π
p − πs) , (22)
where πs ≡ Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A)] and πp ≡ Eθ
£
r(p(θ), θ) 1N
¤
are a firm’s expected
per-period profit when firms separate using the advertising equilibrium, A,
and pool at zero advertising, respectively. The expected per-period profit
under the advertising equilibrium is directly characterized by (9) in the No-
War Program:
Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A)] = r(p(θ), θ)
U
N
+Eθ
∙
D(p(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)
¸
(23)
where M(θ;A) = UN + [1− F (θ)]N−1I and we use that A(θ) = 0.
Solving (22) for the critical discount factor, we obtain that pooling at zero
advertising satisfies the oﬀ-schedule constraint if
δ ≥ bδp ≡ r(p(θ), θ)(N − 1)I
r(p(θ), θ)(N − 1)I +N (πp − πs) . (24)
As shown in Proposition 6, πp > πs if F is log-concave and demand is suﬃ-
ciently inelastic, or if θ− θ is suﬃciently small. Thus, under these conditions,bδp ∈ (0, 1). We have thus established:
Proposition 9. If F is log-concave and demand is suﬃciently inelastic, or
if the support of possible cost types is suﬃciently small, then, for all δ ≥ bδp,
there exists an optimal SPPE, and in any optimal SPPE firms pool at zero
advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
In comparison to Proposition 6, Proposition 9 provides an explicit characteri-
zation of the critical discount factor above which firms can enforce the unique
optimal SPPE outcome, wherein no firm advertises in any period.
We next characterize the critical discount factor, bδ2p ∈ (0, 1), above which
an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary and entails two pooling intervals.
Suppose that a scheme A∗ solves the No-War Program and has two pooling
steps, [θ, y] and (z, θ], and an intermediate sorting interval (y, z].43 The scheme
has jumps at y and at z. Any oﬀ-schedule deviation, ba, takes the form of either
(i) ba > A∗(θ) for θ ∈ [θ, y] or (ii) ba < A∗(θ) for θ ∈ [θ, y]. The first deviation
is to “out-advertise” firms on the interval [θ, y], and the second deviation is
to out-advertise firms on the interval (y, z] or [z, θ]. We now consider the oﬀ-
schedule incentive constraints that are associated with these two deviations.
43Our analysis can be readily modified to characterize the critical discount factor when the
scheme has only two pooling intervals (y = z).
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We begin with the first deviation. This deviation captures all informed
consumers. We show that a firm with type θ has the greatest short-term
gain from the first deviation. Consider first the corresponding oﬀ-schedule
constraint for θ ∈ [θ, y]. Among the types on [θ, y], a firm with cost type θ
has the greatest short-term gain from the deviation. We may represent the
oﬀ-schedule constraint for θ as
r(p(θ), θ)
µ
U
N
+ I −M(θ;A∗)
¶
≤ δ
1− δ
¡
π2p − πs
¢
, (25)
where π2p ≡ Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A∗)] is a firm’s expected per-period profit under the
two-step scheme A∗ described above. The LHS represents the short-term gain
for θ. Consider next the oﬀ-schedule constraint for θ > y. The short-term
gain for θ ∈ (y, θ] is
r(p(θ), θ)
µ
U
N
+ I −M(θ;A∗)
¶
− [A∗(θ)−A∗(θ)] (26)
= r(p(θ), θ)
µ
U
N
+ I −M(θ;A∗)
¶
− [Π(θ, θ;A∗)−Π(θ, θ;A∗)],
where the equality utilizes Π(θ, θ;A∗) = r(p(θ), θ)M(θ;A∗) − A∗(θ). Note
that Π(θ, θ;A∗) ≥ Π(θ, θ;A∗) is ensured by (On-IC). It then follows that the
short-term gain for θ in (25) is greater than for θ ∈ (y, θ] in (26).
For the first deviation, we may thus solve (25) for the critical discount
factor. We find that the first deviation is unattractive to a firm with type θ,
and thus to a firm with any type θ, if
δ ≥ bδθ,y ≡ r(p(θ), θ)(1− μ(y))Ir(p(θ), θ)(1− μ(y))I + (π2p − πs) . (27)
Since [θ, y] is a pooling interval, μ(y) in (27) is defined by
μ(y) ≡
N−1X
j=0
µ
N − 1
j
¶
1
j + 1
[F (y)]j [1− F (y)]N−j−1 . (28)
Given our assumption that A∗ has two pooling regions and solves the No-War
Program, we have that μ(y) ∈ (0, 1) and π2p > πs, from which it follows thatbδθ,y ∈ (0, 1).
We next explore the second deviation. We show that a firm with type z
has the greatest short-term gain from the second deviation. Consider first
a deviation with ba that is slightly above the on-schedule advertising A∗+(y),
where A∗+(y) ≡ lim supθ>y A∗(θ) represents the limit from the right. Under
this deviation, a firm out-advertises firms on the sorting interval (y, z] and thus
obtains the market share UN + [1−F (y)]N−1I. Note that any firm with type θ
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can earn the same market share when it chooses the on-schedule advertising
A∗+(y). Hence, as long as (On-IC) holds for θ, then the firm with type θ will
not undertake such an oﬀ-schedule deviation. Consider next a deviation with ba
that is slightly above zero. With this deviation, a firm out-advertises firms on
(z, θ] and thus obtains the market share UN+[1−F (z)]N−1I. Note that any firm
with type θ can earn the same market share when it chooses the on-schedule
advertising A∗(z). Thus, the short-term gain from the second deviation for
type θ becomes
r(p(θ), θ) [M(z;A∗)−M(θ;A∗)] +A∗(θ) (29)
= Π(z, θ;A∗)−Π(θ, θ;A∗) +A∗(z) ≤ A∗(z),
where the inequality follows since (On-IC) ensures Π(θ, θ;A∗) ≥ Π(z, θ;A∗).
The RHS of the inequality, A∗(z), represents the short-term gain when θ = z.
Thus, a firm with type z gains the most from out-advertising firms on (z, θ].
Observe that a firm with type z’s short-term gain, A∗(z), is the level of the
jump made at z such that (On-IC) is binding:
A∗(z) = r(p(z), z)[1− F (z)]N−1I
µ
1− 1
N
¶
. (30)
We may thus represent the oﬀ-schedule constraint for type z as
r(p(z), z)[1− F (z)]N−1I
µ
1− 1
N
¶
≤ δ
1− δ
¡
π2p − πs
¢
. (31)
For the second deviation, we may thus solve (31) for the critical discount
factor. We find that the second deviation is unattractive to a firm with type
z, and thus to a firm with any type θ, if
δ ≥ bδz,θ ≡ r(p(z), z)(N − 1)[1− F (z)]N−1Ir(p(z), z)(N − 1)[1− F (z)]N−1I +N (π2p − πs) . (32)
Arguing as above, we can establish that bδz,θ ∈ (0, 1).
We are now ready to summarize our findings concerning oﬀ-schedule con-
straints and the posited optimal SPPE with two pooling intervals. In partic-
ular, the no-war scheme A∗ satisfies all oﬀ-schedule constraints if (27) and
(32) are satisfied; thus, this scheme satisfies all oﬀ-schedule constraints if
δ ≥ bδ2p ≡ max{bδθ,y,bδz,θ}, where the critical discount factor, bδ2p, satisfiesbδ2p ∈ (0, 1).
Thus far, we have characterized critical discount factors within the class of
stationary (no-war) SPPE. As we show in previous sections, for suﬃciently
patient firms, the use of a stationary (no-war) scheme does not limit the scope
of optimal SPPE: the payoﬀs achieved in any optimal non-stationary SPPE
35
Bagwell and Lee: Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets
Brought to you by | Singapore Management University
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/2/15 3:34 PM
can always be achieved as well in an optimal SPPE that is stationary. In
fact, this same result holds as well when firms are less patient and oﬀ-schedule
constraints may bind. Intuitively, if an oﬀ-schedule constraints is an issue, it is
better to shift current-period profit toward the future, as a firm then has more
to lose in the future by undertaking an oﬀ-schedule deviation in the present.
Exploiting the substitutability between current advertising and future wars,
firms can achieve the desired shift by increasing advertising and eliminating
future wars. Athey, et al (2004) provide a related argument in their analysis
of price collusion among impatient firms, and so we do not develop this point
in further detail here.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the advertising behavior of firms with private information as
to their respective costs. We begin by considering a static advertising game
in which each firm’s advertising choice may signal its costs, and thus its price,
to those consumers who are informed of advertising activities. In the static
game, an advertising equilibrium exists, in which informed consumers use an
advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. In
this equilibrium, non-price advertising directs consumers to the firm with the
lowest cost and price in the market.44 We next analyze a repeated advertising
game in which privately informed firms may achieve a self-enforcing agreement
to limit the use of advertising. We observe that firms face trade-oﬀs when
selecting an optimal collusive scheme: while the use of advertising can direct
sales to lower-cost firms and thereby promote productive eﬃciency, it can do
so only when suﬃcient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. If
firms sacrifice productive eﬃciency by pooling at zero advertising, they can
eliminate current and future advertising expenses. Allowing for a wide range
of collusive advertising behaviors, we establish conditions under which optimal
collusion entails pooling at zero advertising. We also show that, under general
conditions, optimal collusion involves at least partial pooling and thus strictly
improves upon the repeated use of the static advertising equilibrium.
Thus, while non-price advertising can promote production eﬃciency and
raise consumer welfare, firms have incentive to limit the use of such advertis-
ing. In practice, an agreement to limit advertising is directly achieved when
advertising is prohibited by state law, as we emphasize in our companion pa-
per (Bagwell and Lee, 2010). When advertising is legal, firms may instead
limit advertising as part of a self-enforcing collusive agreement. An agreement
to limit advertising may raise the expected profit of firms, but it also reduces
44The static advertising game is analyzed in greater detail in our companion paper (Bagwell
and Lee, 2010).
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the welfare of informed consumers, who use non-price advertising to identify
the lowest-price firm in the market.45 As a result, informed consumers incur
a higher average transaction price when firms collude in advertising.
We close by mentioning two possible extensions of the model. A first pos-
sibility is that advertising by any one firm may have a public-good aspect and
serve to expand the size of market demand. By contrast, in the model ana-
lyzed above, advertising is redistributive: the size of aggregate demand is not
aﬀected by advertising, and so one firm’s market-share gain is another firms’
market-share loss. In the case of public-good advertising, when a firm ad-
vertises more, aggregate demand increases and so rival firms benefit to some
degree as well. In this setting, colluding firms may have incentive to share
advertising expenses. For new-product markets in particular, an analysis of
such collusive advertising is an important direction for future work.
A second possibility is to extend our analysis to allow for asymmetric equi-
libria. In their price-collusion model, Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that
profit may be higher in asymmetric perfect public equilibria than in SPPE.
They emphasize the role of future market share favors, whereby a firm that
claims low costs and enjoys high market share today suﬀers a reduced market
share in the future. Rival firms then enjoy a future market share gain. In
this way, asymmetric equilibria allow that continuation values may be used
to satisfy on-schedule constraints, without requiring that firms symmetrically
experience a reduced continuation value.46 In their model, consumers observe
prices and have no independent interest in firms’ costs. By contrast, in our
advertising model, informed consumers observe advertising and draw infer-
ences as to costs and thus prices. The construction of asymmetric equilibria
may be more challenging in this context. Suppose that one firm advertises
heavily in the current period and that the equilibrium then requires that this
45In our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010), we show that a legal ban on non-price
advertising may lower social surplus, when the number of firms is determined by a zero-profit
condition. In the current paper, by contrast, we consider collusion among a fixed number
of firms earning positive profit. Collusion raises (lowers) expected producer (informed-
consumer) surplus, and so the implication of collusion for expected social surplus is subtle.
Comparisons can be made in special cases. For example, if the support of possible cost
types is suﬃciently small, then optimal collusion eliminates (essentially wasteful) advertising
competition and raises expected social surplus. We thank a referee for suggesting this
comparison.
46As Athey and Bagwell (2008) show in their analysis of price collusion, however, when cost
shocks are persistent, the advantage of asymmetric equilibria may be significantly reduced.
Indeed, if demand is perfectly inelastic and the distribution of types is log-concave, they
show that a stationary pooling equilibrium is optimal for patient firms when cost types are
perfectly persistent. Lee (2010) shows that the potential disadvantage of SPPE may diminish
when colluding firms use a contractual device to restrict their incentives to distort private
information for their own gain.
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firm advertise less in the future, so as to transfer future market share to other
firms. If informed consumers understand the equilibrium, then they recognize
that the reduced level of advertising by this firm in some future period is not
necessarily a signal that this firm has a high cost and thus a high price in that
period. Thus, even if the equilibrium calls for reduced advertising by this firm,
this in itself does not guarantee that the firm obtains reduced market share.
7 Appendix
This appendix has three parts. The first part extends our analysis so as to
consider the robustness of the results of the repeated game to a relaxation
under which past price selections are publicly observed by all firms. The second
part derives the expected profit in (13). The third part provides proofs.
7.1 Public Price Histories
In our repeated-game analysis, we assume that each firm observes the realiza-
tion of rival firms’ past advertising choices but not the realization of rival firms’
past pricing choices. This assumption may be appropriate in retail markets
with complex and customer-specific pricing schemes, or when search costs are
high. It also enables us to set prices at monopoly levels, so that we may focus
on the incentive constraints that are associated with collusion in advertising.
This assumption is not always plausible, however, and we now briefly discuss
the robustness of our analysis when this assumption is relaxed.
In our extended model, each firm observes the realizations of rival firms’
past advertising and price choices. A firm with cost type θ can then undertake
an on-schedule deviation only if it mimics the advertising and price selection
of a firm with cost type bθ. The gain from mimicry then can be reduced, and
new equilibria exist. At the same time, the equilibria that we characterize
above - in which firms set their monopoly prices - continue to exist when price
histories are public. In the extended model, if firms simply condition their
future play on the public history of advertising, then firms again set their
monopoly prices.
Formally, in the repeated game with public price histories, we denote a
candidate advertising and pricing schedule as (A, ρ), where ρ(θ) may diﬀer
from the monopoly price p(θ). If a firm of cost type θ mimics the advertising
and price selection of a firm of cost type bθ, then it must select A(bθ) and ρ(bθ).
To use the Relaxed Program, we let W (bθ) ≡ δ[supV − v(A(bθ), ρ(bθ);A, ρ)] and
write the interim-stage profit as
Π(bθ, θ;A, ρ) ≡ r(ρ(bθ), θ)M(bθ;A)−A(bθ)−W (bθ).
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at a finite number of points where the functions may jump.
The scheme (A, ρ,W ) satisfies on-schedule incentive compatibility only if
two conditions hold. First, a local optimality condition must hold. Under
an appropriate envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002), we may use
Π2(bθ, θ;A, ρ) = −D(ρ(bθ))M(bθ;A) to get
Π(θ, θ;A, ρ) = r(ρ(θ), θ)M(θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ) +
Z θ
θ
D(ρ(x))M(x;A)dx.
Second, a monotonicity condition must hold: D(ρ(θ))M(θ;A) must be non-
increasing in θ. This is established by adding two on-schedule incentive con-
straints:
r(ρ(θ), θ)M(θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ) ≥ r(ρ(bθ), θ)M(bθ;A)−A(bθ)−W (bθ)
r(ρ(bθ),bθ)M(bθ;A)−A(bθ)−W (bθ) ≥ r(ρ(θ),bθ)M(θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ).
As in Lemma 1, these two necessary conditions are also suﬃcient for (A, ρ,W )
to satisfy on-schedule incentive compatibility.
We now restrict attention to those incentive-compatible schemes (A, ρ,W )
for which informed consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule.
Given this restriction, we find that A(θ) must be nonincreasing and ρ(θ) must
be nondecreasing; thus, (A, ρ,W ) satisfies on-schedule incentive compatibility
and is also consistent with the rational use of the advertising search rule only
if M(θ;A) and D(ρ(θ)) are each nonincreasing.47 Consider next the poten-
tial use of wars. When past prices are public, we cannot immediately use
the arguments in Proposition 3 to establish that wars are unnecessary. The
reason is that incentive compatibility no longer ensures that A(θ) +W (θ) is
nonincreasing; hence, we cannot be sure that an alternative scheme defined by
A∗(θ) ≡ A(θ) +W (θ) would exhibit the necessary nonincreasing property.48
We can establish that wars are unnecessary in the limiting case where demand
47Assume to the contrary that θ > θ and A(θ) > A(b bθ). Given the restriction that
informed consumers rationally use the advertising search rule, this assumption implies
M(θ;A) > M(bθ;A) and ρ(θ) ≤ ρ(bθ) (i.e., D(ρ(θ)) ≥ D(ρ(bθ))). Thus, A(θ) > A(bθ) implies
D(ρ(θ))M(θ;A) > D(ρ(bθ))M(bθ;A), which contradicts the requirement thatD(ρ(θ))M(θ;A)
is nonincreasing. Hence, A(θ) must be nonincreasing. Under the restriction that in-
formed consumers rationally use the advertising search rule, if A(θ) is nonincreasing, then
M(θ;A) is nonincreasing and ρ(θ) is nondecreasing (i.e., D(ρ(θ)) is nonincreasing).
48Consider a two-step scheme in which A is at a high (low) level for cost types below
(at or above) a critical type, θc. Suppose that ρ(θ) = p(θc) for types at or above θc
while ρ(θ) = p(θ) for types below θc. Even though market share is higher for lower types, a
firm with type θc may earn greater net revenue by setting its monopoly price and accepting a
lower market share. On-schedule incentive compatibility would then require that A(θ) +
W (θ) is higher for higher types.
For simplicity, we assume that A and ρ are continuously diﬀerentiable except
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is perfectly inelastic; however, the arguments used for this limiting case cannot
be directly applied when demand is downward sloping.49
We now argue that robust forces in favor of at least partial pooling in ad-
vertising are present in the extended model. We develop our argument in
three steps. First, we consider the limiting case in which demand is perfectly
inelastic and assume that the reservation value r satisfies r > θ. As just noted,
in this case, wars are unnecessary, and so we focus on stationary SPPE (i.e.,
schemes (A, ρ,W ) in which W ≡ 0). Let us now fix any candidate nonde-
creasing pricing schedule ρ(θ) satisfying ρ(θ) > θ.50 In the case of perfectly
inelastic demand, our monotonicity requirement reduces to the requirement
that M(θ;A) is nonincreasing. Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 5, if
F is log-concave, we may establish that expected profit is then maximized
by the advertising schedule in which A(θ) ≡ 0, so that M(θ;A) ≡ 1N . With
A(θ) ≡ 0 ≡ W (θ), there is no potential gain to firms from distorting prices;
thus, the optimal nondecreasing pricing schedule entails monopoly pricing with
ρ(θ) ≡ r. Thus, for the limiting case in which demand is perfectly inelastic,
whether or not rivals’ past prices are publicly observed, we can construct an
optimal SPPE for patient firms in which firms pool at zero advertising in each
period.
Second, returning to our assumption of downward-sloping demand, let us
consider any incentive-compatible scheme (A, ρ,W ) for which D(ρ(θ)) and
49Suppose that demand is perfectly inelastic and consider a two-step scheme. The two steps
are separated by a critical type, θc, and we let θb represent a type on the bottom step
and θt represent a type on the top step (i.e., θb < θc < θt). Suppose that A(θb) >
A(θt) and thus M(θb;A) > M(θt;A). Suppose further that A +W increases across the
steps: A(θt) + W (θt) > A(θb) + W (θb). Incentive compatibility is satisfied if type θc
is indiﬀerent between the two steps. Given that the top step entails a lower value for
M and a higher value for A + W , this is possible only if the top step entails a higher
price: ρ(θt) > ρ(θb). We now create a new scheme, in whichW (θt) is lowered to a new value,
WN (θt), at which A(θb)+W (θb) = A(θt)+WN (θt)+ε, for ε > 0 small. To maintain incentive
compatibility, we adjust ρ(θt) downward until type θc is again indiﬀerent. The resulting new
price, ρN (θt), satisfies ρN (θt) > ρ(θb). This maneuver maintains profit for all types. We next
eliminate wars and define A∗ in terms of the new scheme: A∗(θb) = A(θb) +W (θb) and
A∗(θt) = A(θt)+WN (θt). Note that A∗ decreases with θ as we move from the bottom step to
the top step, just as did A; hence, A∗ generates the same market share allocation as did A.
We have thus generated a point-wise equivalent no-war scheme. Finally, we note that,
if demand were instead downward sloping, then such step-by-step maneuvers would not
generate a point-wise equivalent no-war scheme. This is because the appeal of a price
change then varies with cost type. For related reasons, Athey et al. (2004) are also unable to
eliminate wars when demand is downward sloping.
50If ρ(θ) ≤ θ for a nondecreasing price schedule, we could raise ρ(θ) above θ and adjust all
prices for lower types upward so as to maintain incentive compatibility. This maneuver
would raise expected profit, and so we may restrict attention to candidate pricing schedules
satisfying ρ(θ) > θ.
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M(θ;A) are nonincreasing, and let us further restrict consideration to pricing
functions for which D(ρ(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing and ρ(θ) ≥ θ. Expected
profit for incentive-compatible schemes can be represented as
Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A, ρ)] = r(ρ(θ), θ)M(θ;A)−A(θ)−W (θ)+Eθ
∙
D(ρ(θ))
F
f
(θ)M(θ;A)
¸
.
If we maximize this expression over the incentive-compatible schemes under
consideration, then we may argue as in the proof of Proposition 5 that expected
profit is maximized when M(θ;A) ≡ 1N and thus A∗ ≡ 0. In a case of special
interest, the restriction that D(ρ(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing is satisfied if F is
log-concave and all types of firms set a constant price, ρ ≡ ρ(θ) ≥ θ. Firms may
set a constant price for a variety of (unmodeled) reasons, including resale price
maintenance requirements and customer market concerns. In fact, when these
reasons apply and a constant price is used, we can argue as in Proposition 3
and show that, if F is log-concave, then optimal SPPE for patient firms entails
A∗ ≡ 0 and W ∗ ≡ 0. Of course, in the case where price is exogenously fixed
at p, it is immaterial whether or not price is public.
Third, robust forces remain in favor of at least partial pooling in advertising
even for general demand functions.51 We make this point in a simple way.
Consider any scheme (A, ρ,W ) in which A entails full sorting over [θ, θ]. We
construct an alternative scheme (A∗ ≡ 0, ρ∗,W ∗ ≡ 0), where ρ∗ is constant
and satisfiesZ θ
θ
D(ρ∗)
1
N
dF (x) =
Z θ
θ
D(ρ(x))[
U
N
+ [1− F (x)]N−1I]dF (x).
We then define a distribution function under A∗ ≡ 0 and ρ∗:
G (θ;A∗, ρ∗) ≡
R θ
θ D(ρ
∗) 1N f(x)dxR θ
θ D(ρ
∗) 1N f(x)dx
.
A distribution G (θ;A, ρ) is analogously defined under A and ρ. Given that
G(θ;A∗, ρ∗) first-order stochastically dominates G (θ;A, ρ), if F is log-concave,
then the alternative scheme generates higher expected information rents than
does the original scheme:Z θ
θ
F
f
(θ)D(ρ∗)
1
N
dF (θ) ≥
Z θ
θ
F
f
(θ)D(ρ(θ))[
U
N
+ [1− F (x)]N−1I]dF (θ).
If ρ∗ > θ and I is suﬃciently large such that r(ρ∗, θ) 1N ≥ r(ρ(θ), θ)
U
N , then
the alternative scheme does not cause any reduction in the profit at the top.
51Our discussion here builds on Athey et al. (2004).
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As we argue above, however, as a general matter, we cannot directly conclude
that wars are unnecessary under general demand functions.
7.2 Derivation of Expected Profit
We show that, if A has a pooling interval with A(θ) = 0 on (y, θ] and jumps
to a sorting interval on [θ, y], then it has the expected profit (13) in the text.
The interim-stage profit for θ ≤ y is
R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) = R(y, y;A)−A(y) +
Z y
θ
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx, (A1)
while the interim-stage profit at y is
R(y, y;A)−A(y) = R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) +
Z θ
y
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx. (A2)
Using (A1) and (A2), we find the interim-stage profit for θ ≤ y:
θ,R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) = R( θ;A)−A(θ) +
Z y
θ
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx (A3)
+
Z θ
y
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx.
The interim-stage profit for θ > y is
R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) = R(θ, θ;A)−A(θ) +
Z θ
θ
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx. (A4)
Based on the two interim-stage profits, (A3) and (A4), we find the expected
profit (13) by integrating by parts and setting A(θ) = 0.
7.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove that any optimal no-war scheme (A,W ≡ 0)
has pooling at the top interval (y, θ] where A(θ) = 0. Suppose that a scheme
has a sorting interval at the top on (y, θ]. Then we can consider an alternative
scheme A∗ that decomposes the sorting interval (y, θ] into a sorting interval
(y, y∗] and a pooling interval (y∗, θ] where y∗ > y. The expected profit under
A∗ becomes
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Eθ[Π(θ, θ;A∗)] = r(p(θ), θ)
∙
U
N
+ [1− F (y∗)]N−1 I
N
¸
+
Z y
θ
D(p(θ))F (θ)M(θ;A∗)dθ
+
Z y∗
y
D(p(θ))F (θ)
∙
U
N
+ [1− F (θ)]N−1I
¸
dθ
+
Z θ
y∗
D(p(θ))F (θ)
∙
U
N
+ [1− F (y∗)]N−1 I
N
¸
dθ.
Note that, if y∗ → θ, then this scheme A∗ approaches the initial scheme. We
show that the optimal choice of y∗ is lower than θ. The derivative of expected
profit with respect to y∗ is given by
[1− F (y∗)]N−1 (N − 1)I
N
∙
D(p(y∗))F (y∗)− r(p(θ), θ) f(y
∗)
1− F (y∗)
¸
−(N − 1)I
N
Z θ
y∗
D(p(θ))F (θ)[1− F (y∗)]N−2f(y∗)dθ.
Since f(θ) > 0 and p(θ) > θ, expected profit rises when y∗ slightly falls from
θ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume that a no-war scheme A entails sorting for
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] such that
{θ : A0(θ) < 0} ∩
n
θ : D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing
o
= (θi, θi+1].
This interval (θi, θi+1] cannot be the interval at the top, given that we restrict
attention to the no-war scheme that has pooling at zero advertising on an
interval at the top. We define an alternative no-war scheme A∗ as:
A∗(θ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A(θ) if θ > θi+1
A∗p ≡ A+(θi+1) + r(p(θi+1), θi+1) [M(θ;A∗)−M+(θi+1;A∗)] if θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]
A∗(θi) ≡ A∗p + r(p(θi), θi) [M(θ;A∗)−M+(θi;A∗)] if θ = θi
A(θ)− [A(θi)−A∗(θi)] if θ < θi.
The notations A+(θ) and M+(θ;A∗) represent the associated limit from
the right. The alternative scheme jumps at θi and θi+1 such that (On-IC)
is binding at each point. It preserves A above θi+1, pools over (θi, θi+1] and
makes a parallel shift from A by A(θi) − A∗(θi) below θi. In our notation,
M(θ;A∗) for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] equals M+(θi;A∗).
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We first prove that, if φ(θ) ≡ D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is nondecreasing for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1],
then expected profit is weakly higher under A∗ than under A. We define the
distribution function under A∗:
G(θi, θi+1;A∗) ≡
R θ
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dxR θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx
for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1],
where M(x;A∗) represents the market share allocated to x ∈ (θi, θi+1] under
pooling:
M(x;A∗) =
U
N
+
N−1X
j=0
µ
N − 1
j
¶
1
j + 1
[F (θi+1)− F (θi)]j [1− F (θi+1)]N−j−1 I.
(A5)
The distributionG (θi, θi+1;A) is analogously defined underAwhereM(x;A) =
U
N +[1−F (x)]N−1I. We next show that G(θi, θi+1;A∗) first-order stochastically
dominates G(θi, θi+1;A).
To this end, we begin by showing that the two distribution functions have
the same denominators:
∀θi+1 ≥ θi,
Z θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx =
Z θi+1
θi
M(x;A)f(x)dx. (A6)
The equality is immediate if θi+1 = θi. For any θi+1 > θi, we claim that
∂
R θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx
∂θi+1
=
∂
R θi+1
θi
M(x;A)f(x)dx
∂θi+1
. (A7)
In other words, the expected market shares (denominators) are the same in
both schemes at θi+1 = θi, and we claim that they then increase at the same
rate as θi+1 rises above θi. Given that A∗ is pooling on (θi, θi+1], the LHS of
(A7) is
∂
R θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx
∂θi+1
=
∙
U
N
+ [1− F (θi+1)]N−1I
¸
f(θi+1)
=
∂
R θi+1
θi
£
U
N + [1− F (x)]N−1I
¤
f(x)dx
∂θi+1
=
∂
R θi+1
θi
M(x;A)f(x)dx
∂θi+1
.
Using (A5), the first equality is established by a tedious work of induction for
N ≥ 2. The last term is the RHS of (A7). Our claim that (A7) holds is now
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established. Hence, the denominators of the two distributions are the same.
Further, using M(x;A) = UN + [1− F (x)]N−1I, we can deriveZ θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx =
Z θi+1
θi
M(x;A)f(x)dx (A8)
=
£
[1− F (θi)]N − [1− F (θi+1)]N
¤ I
N
+ [F (θi+1)− F (θi)]
U
N
,
so that we now have an explicit expression for the common value taken by the
denominators of the two distributions.
We next diﬀerentiate the two distribution functions with respect to θ. Since
the denominators are the same and do not change with θ as seen in (A8), we
find
∂
∂θ
[G (θi, θi+1;A)−G(θi, θi+1;A∗)] =
[M(θ;A)−M(θ;A∗)] f(θ)R θi+1
θi
M(x;A∗)f(x)dx
,
where M(θ;A) = UN + [1− F (θ)]
N−1 I and M(θ;A∗) is given by (A5). Given
the range (θi, θi+1], M(θ;A∗) crosses M(θ;A) from below. It then follows
that G(θi, θi+1;A∗) first-order stochastically dominates G(θi, θi+1;A). In other
words, G (θi, θi+1;A) > G(θi, θi+1;A∗) for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1) and G (θi, θi+1;A) =
G(θi, θi+1;A∗) for θ ∈ {θi, θi+1}.
We next compare the expected profits under the two schemes. Suppose that
A∗ is represented by K subintervals; note that the original scheme A may be
represented by less thanK subintervals if A involves sorting consecutively over
its neighboring interval, (θi−1, θi] or (θi+1, θi+2]. The expected profit under A∗
is
Eθ [Π(θ, θ;A∗)] = r(p(θ), θ)M(θ;A∗) (A9)
+
KX
k 6=i,k=1
Z θk+1
θk
φ(θ)M(θ;A∗)f(θ)dθ
+
Z θi+1
θi
φ(θ)M(θ;A∗)f(θ)dθ.
Since A∗ is designed to preserve the original market shares under A except for
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] (as proven below), the expected profit under A is the same as
the RHS of (A9) except for the last information-rent term. To compare the
associated information-rent terms, we evaluate the diﬀerential:
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Z θi+1
θi
φ(θ)dG(θi, θi+1;A∗)−
Z θi+1
θi
φ(θ)dG (θi, θi+1;A)
=
Z θi+1
θi
φ0(θ) [G (θi, θi+1;A)−G(θi, θi+1;A∗)] dθ.
If φ0(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1], thenZ θi+1
θi
φ(θ)dG(θi, θi+1;A∗) ≥
Z θi+1
θi
φ(θ)dG (θi, θi+1;A) .
The inequality can be rewritten asZ θi+1
θi
φ(θ)M(θ;A∗)f(θ)dθ ≥
Z θi+1
θi
φ(θ)M(θ;A)f(θ)dθ.
Thus, if φ0(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1], then A∗ makes a weakly higher expected
profit than A. Further, if φ0(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and φ0(θ) > 0 for some
θ ∈ (θi, θi+1), then A∗ makes a strictly higher expected profit than A; in this
case, an optimal no-war scheme cannot entail sorting for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1].
We next show that A∗ preserves the original market shares under A except
for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]. Consider two cases. Suppose first that the original scheme
is sorting consecutively over its neighboring interval, (θi−1, θi] or (θi+1, θi+2],
so that A is sorting for θ ∈ (θi−1, θi+1] or for θ ∈ (θi, θi+2]. Then, pooling on
(θi, θi+1] does not aﬀect the (expected) market share for types on the neigh-
boring sorting interval; in particular, for any sorting interval, the market share
for θ is UN + [1− F (θ)]
N−1 I. Suppose second that the original scheme is sort-
ing for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and is adjacent to a pooling interval. If A is pooling for
θ ∈ (θi−1, θi] or for θ ∈ (θi+1, θi+2], then it has a jump at θi or at θi+1. If A is
pooling on (θi−1, θi], then the market share for θ ∈ (θi−1, θi] is the same under
A and under A∗:
U
N
+
N−1X
j=0
µ
N − 1
j
¶
1
j + 1
[F (θi)− F (θi−1)]j [1− F (θi)]N−j−1 I.
Likewise, ifA is pooling on (θi+1, θi+2], then the market share for θ ∈ (θi+1, θi+2]
is the same under both schemes. If the original market shares for the neighbor-
ing intervals are not aﬀected by A∗, then the market shares for the remaining
types will not be aﬀected by A∗.
We finally show that our result holds for any optimal SPPE. Assume that
an optimal SPPE exists in which the associated advertising schedule entails
sorting for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] when φ0(θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] and φ0(θ) > 0 for some
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θ ∈ (θi, θi+1). We may translate the factorization of this SPPE into a scheme
(A,W ) that satisfies the constraints of the Relaxed Program. This scheme
in turn is point-wise equivalent to a no-war scheme (A∗,W ∗ ≡ 0), where
A∗ is sorting for θ ∈ (θi, θi+1]. As argued above, this no-war scheme can be
strictly improved upon by an alternative no-war scheme that is pooling for θ ∈
(θi, θi+1]. If firms are suﬃciently patient, we can construct an SPPE in which
the advertising schedule from this alternative no-war scheme is used in every
period along the equilibrium path. This contradicts our initial assumption. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8. We show that an optimal SPPE has at most
two pooling steps when φ(θ) ≡ D(p(θ))Ff (θ) is strictly quasiconcave with a
maximizer θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ]. When θ∗ = θ, the proof is immediate from Proposition
6. Hence, we consider the case in which θ < θ∗ < θ. We establish the finding
in three steps.
Step 1: We establish two findings. First, an optimal SPPE cannot have two
separate pooling steps within [θ, θ∗] where φ0(θ) > 0. Suppose that an optimal
scheme A has two separate pooling intervals, [θ, y] and (y, z], within [θ, θ∗] such
that θ < y < z ≤ θ∗. We construct an alternative scheme A∗ that replaces
the two pooling steps with one pooling step for θ ∈ [θ, z]. The original market
shares under A are aﬀected by A∗ for θ ∈ [θ, z]. Given the aﬀected range [θ, z],
define the distribution function under A:
G (θ, z;A) ≡
R θ
θ M(x;A)f(x)dxR y
θ M(x;A)f(x)dx+
R z
y M(x;A)f(x)dx
for θ ∈ [θ, z]. (A10)
The distribution function under A∗ is
G(θ, z;A∗) ≡
R θ
θ M(x;A
∗)f(x)dxR z
θ M(x;A
∗)f(x)dx
for θ ∈ [θ, z]. (A11)
The denominators of distributions are the same. Using (A8), the denominator
of (A10) is £
[1− F (θ)]N − [1− F (y)]N
¤ I
N
+ [F (y)− F (θ)]U
N
+
£
[1− F (y)]N − [1− F (z)]N
¤ I
N
+ [F (z)− F (y)]U
N
=
£
[1− F (θ)]N − [1− F (z)]N
¤ I
N
+ [F (z)− F (θ)]U
N
.
The RHS is the denominator of (A11). In the range [θ, z], M(θ;A∗) crosses
M(θ;A) from below and thus G(θ, z;A∗) first-order stochastically dominates
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G(θ, z;A): G(θ, z;A) > G(θ, z;A∗) for θ ∈ (θ, z) and G(θ, z;A) = G(θ, z;A∗)
for θ ∈ {θ, z}. It then follows that the expected profit is strictly higher under
A∗ than under A. This contradicts the optimality of A. This non-optimality
of the original scheme can be readily extended to any other scheme that has
multiple pooling steps or includes some sorting interval within [θ, z].
Second, given φ0(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (θ∗, θ], an optimal scheme cannot include
a separate pooling interval within (θ∗, θ] other than at the top. Suppose that
a scheme A has a separate pooling step (θ∗, y] other than the pooling step at
the top (z, θ]. We construct an alternative scheme A∗ that replaces pooling
with sorting for θ ∈ (θ∗, y]. The original market shares under A are aﬀected by
A∗ for θ ∈ (θ∗, y]. Given the aﬀected range (θ∗, y], the distribution G(θ∗, y;A)
first-order stochastically dominatesG(θ∗, y;A∗). We then compare the aﬀected
information-rent terms:Z y
θ∗
φ(x)dG(θ∗, y;A∗)−
Z y
θ∗
φ(x)dG (θ∗, y;A)
=
Z y
θ∗
φ0(x) [G (θ∗, y;A)−G(θ∗, y;A∗)] dx > 0.
Thus, the expected profit is strictly higher under A∗ than under A. This
contradicts the optimality of A.
Step 2: An optimal SPPE cannot have three pooling steps; in particular,
it cannot have an intermediate pooling interval (other than pooling at the
bottom and at the top). Since an optimal SPPE cannot include two separate
pooling steps or any sorting interval within [θ, θ∗] where φ0(θ) > 0, and since
it cannot have a separate pooling step within (θ∗, θ] other than at the top,
the only possibility for an optimal SPPE candidate A to have three pooling
steps is that the scheme has two pooling steps, [θ, y] and (y, z], such that
θ < y < θ∗ < z < θ. We construct an alternative scheme A∗ that has two
pooling steps, [θ, y∗] and (y∗, z], such that θ < θ∗ < y∗ < z < θ. Observe that
M(θ;A∗) < M(θ;A) for θ ∈ [θ, y] and θ ∈ (y∗, z] (A12)
M(θ;A∗) > M(θ;A) for θ ∈ (y, y∗].
For the aﬀected range [θ, z], we use (20) to define the distributions, G(θ, z;A∗)
and G(θ, z;A). Since the two functions have the same fixed denominators, we
find
∂
∂θ
[G(θ, z;A)−G(θ, z;A∗)] = [M(θ;A)−M(θ;A
∗)] f(θ)R z
θ M(x;A
∗)f(x)dx
.
Given the inequalities in (A12), the slope of G(θ, z;A∗) is flatter (steeper)
than that of G (θ, z;A) at the bottom [θ, y] and at the top (y∗, z] (at the inter-
mediate range (y, y∗]). Thus, in the range [θ, z], G(θ, z;A∗) crosses G(θ, z;A)
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from below other than at the two endpoints, θ and z, where G(θ, z;A∗) =
G(θ, z;A). The choice of the point y∗ is made to satisfy θ∗ < y∗ < z. If
y∗ ≤ θ∗, then G(θ, z;A∗) crosses G (θ, z;A) at type θ < θ∗, since the slope of
G(θ, z;A∗) is flatter than that of G (θ, z;A) in the range (y∗, z]. If y∗ = z, then
G(θ, z;A∗) crossesG (θ, z;A) at the endpoint z > θ∗; if y∗ = z, thenG(θ, z;A∗)
first-order stochastically dominates G(θ, z;A): G(θ, z;A∗) < G(θ, z;A) for all
θ ∈ (θ, z). It is thus possible to adjust the level of y∗ such that G(θ, z;A∗)
crosses G(θ, z;A) from below at θ∗: G(θ, z;A∗) < G(θ, z;A) for θ ∈ (θ, θ∗) and
G(θ, z;A∗) > G(θ, z;A) for θ ∈ (θ∗, z). Given the choice of y∗, we may use
(21) to compare the two aﬀected information-rent terms and thereby conclude
that the expected profit is strictly higher under A∗ than under A. This is a
contradiction for A to be optimal. Further, note that, other than the pooling
at the top, A∗ now includes a separate pooling step (y∗, z] within (θ∗, θ] where
φ0(θ) < 0. We can then construct another alternative scheme that replaces
pooling with sorting for θ ∈ (y∗, z] and strictly improves upon the scheme A∗.
Hence, if φ(θ) is strictly quasiconcave with a maximizer θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ], then an
optimal SPPE cannot have an intermediate pooling interval.
Step 3: If an intermediate sorting interval, (y, z], is ever used, then it is re-
stricted to a subset of the range in which φ0(θ) < 0: θ∗ < y < z < θ. If a
scheme A has three intervals, [θ, y], (y, z] and (z, θ], such that y ≤ θ∗, then
we can construct an alternative scheme A∗ that has three intervals, [θ, y∗],
(y∗, z] and (z, θ], such that y∗ > θ∗. The alternative scheme lengthens the
first pooling step beyond the range [θ, θ∗]. The original market shares under
A are aﬀected by A∗ for θ ∈ [θ, y∗]. Given the aﬀected types θ ∈ [θ, y∗], define
the distributions, G(θ, y∗;A∗) and G(θ, y∗;A). Since A∗ has one pooling step,
M(θ;A∗) crosses M(θ;A) from below, and G(θ, y∗;A∗) first-order stochasti-
cally dominates G(θ, y∗;A). We then compare the aﬀected information-rent
terms: Z y∗
θ
φ(θ)dG(θ, y∗;A∗)−
Z y∗
θ
φ(θ)dG (θ, y∗;A)
=
Z θ∗
θ
φ0(θ) [G (θ, y∗;A)−G(θ, y∗;A∗)] dθ
+
Z y∗
θ∗
φ0(θ) [G (θ, y∗;A)−G(θ, y∗;A∗)] dθ.
The first term on the RHS is positive and the second term is negative. We can
choose y∗ slightly above θ∗ so that the RHS becomes strictly positive. This
finding is confirmed by diﬀerentiation of the RHS with respect to y∗:
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Z θ∗
θ
φ0(θ)
∂∆(θ)
∂y∗
dθ +
Z y∗
θ∗
φ0(θ)
∂∆(θ)
∂y∗
dθ + φ0(y∗)∆(y∗),
where ∆(θ) ≡ G (θ, y∗;A) − G(θ, y∗;A∗). Note that ∆(y∗) = 0, and so the
third term is zero. If y∗ approaches θ∗ from the right, then the first term
remains positive given ∂∆(θ)∂y∗ > 0, while the second term approaches zero. ¥
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